History, theory and the definition of wrong: The limitations of analytical criminal jurisprudence

Analytical jurisprudence is less than two hundred years old, and analytical criminal jurisprudence is even younger. Yet the conceptual conclusions reached by analytical criminal jurisprudence have become so firmly established that it is difficult to imagine that they could be otherwise. Specifically, analytical criminal jurisprudence limits the idea of wrong in criminal law to intentional or reckless breach of legal duty or obligation. This delimitation effectively excludes negligence and strict liability from the purview of criminal law.;This thesis asks and answers one simple question: Is the determination of wrong made by analytical criminal jurisprudence the only available basis for arriving at juristic conclusions? While analytical jurisprudence is free to derive fundamental legal concepts from ample and mature systems of positive law and, on the basis of such materials, elaborate coherent conceptual conclusions, it is not absurd to ask whether those conceptual conclusions themselves tell all there is.;Analytical criminal jurisprudence claims that its conceptual conclusion is the quintessence of rationality. Legal history cannot dispute this but it can show that there is another perspective beside the analytical position. This thesis maintains that analytical conclusions are not necessarily the only basis for arriving at rational (jurisprudential) determinations.