'The only completely safe course' Intelligence, atomic monopoly, and the making of American strategy, 1945-1950

On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb, ending America's atomic monopoly that defined the first half-decade of the postwar era. In the years prior to the Soviet test, American intelligence agencies offered a series of intelligence estimates which concluded that Moscow would not develop an atomic bomb until sometime between 1950 and 1953. Historians have regularly pointed to the failure of the intelligence community to "predict" the Soviet test. However, intelligence estimates are not meant to predict; as the term estimates denotes, rather they show the trajectory of events and possible outcomes. Looked at that way, the 1950 to 1953 timeframe provided ample information with which policymakers could make American strategy. Nevertheless, the estimates also contained numerous flawed assumptions and reflected conflicts between rival intelligence agencies. These shortcomings lessened the estimates influence on policymakers' perceptions.;Policymakers also brought their own perception and priorities to the making of American strategy, and recognizing the flaws in the intelligence estimates, they relied on preconceived ideas about the duration of America's atomic monopoly and prioritized personal and organizational interests. Instead of adjusting to the possibility of a Soviet atomic arsenal, policymakers remained wedded to a strategy better suited for atomic monopoly in order to keep costs low. The failure to reconcile ends and means with a Soviet atomic threat just over the horizon led to incoherence in the making of American strategy. Policies formulated in response to the Soviet test, such as the development of the hydrogen bomb and National Security Council report number 68, were just as much a product of incoherence in American strategy during its atomic monopoly as it was the shock of that monopoly's end.