| Over the past several decades, the structure of the international oil industry, both internationally and within oil-producing states, has changed dramatically. The major players in the international oil industry appear to have increasingly become state-owned national oil companies (NOCs). My dissertation addresses the question of how do we explain the differing contemporary roles played by NOCs, international oil companies (IOCs), and state elites within the hydrocarbon sectors of major oil-exporting states that originally adopted statist models of development for their oil industries, based on a comparative historical analysis of two states, Iran and Saudi Arabia. My thesis is that the extent of opportunities for IOC involvement in oil industries organized along statist lines is highly contingent upon the organization of the broader political arena and the sector's relationship with the international oil industry. In Saudi Arabia, the regime is supported by a well-organized and disciplined elite base organized around the institution of the monarchy. This has provided a secure and stable policy environment that has facilitated the emergence of a robust and capable national oil company, Saudi Aramco, which is closely bound to the regime. The open lines of communication between the highest levels of the regime and the company have allowed the company to take on a preeminent role in the setting of petroleum policy and challenge the return of IOCs to the Saudi oil industry. In contrast in Iran, political power has remained fragmented since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Iran is governed by a hybrid regime that integrates elements of both a theocracy and democracy, and rival elite groups have taken advantage of this situation to challenge each other and capture state institutions for their own benefit. These groups have preyed upon the oil sector, which has undercut the ability of the national oil company to develop the country's hydrocarbon resources, and created openings for IOCs to return to the oil industry. |
