The Effects Of The Conformity Threshold On Cooperation In Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Cooperation is a common phenomenon in humans and social animals,and it has a strong influence on collective behavior.In evolutionary game theory,the influence of conformity on group cooperation has been widely explored.Conformity-driven individuals tend to follow the strategies adopted by most neighbors.In most previous studies,individuals used half of their neighbors as a threshold for identifying the majority.However,in practice,individuals can determine majority based on different thresholds.For example,unless the proportion of individuals with the same strategy in the neighborhood reaches three-quarters,they may not follow.Conversely,when less than half of the individuals with the same strategy among individual neighbors,the central individual may also follow.In recent years,conformity-driven has become more and more important in cooperative evolution behavior.In order to further study the influence of conformity-driven on cooperative behavior evolution,here we study the influence of conformity threshold on cooperation in spacial prisoner's dilemma games.In this paper,under the coexistence of conformity-driven and payoff-driven,the influence of different conformity thresholds on the level of group cooperation is studied.Previous studies have shown that coexistence of two learning methods can effectively improve the level of group cooperation.This paper first introduces 8-neighbor and 24-neighbor lattice networks to adopt different conformity thresholds,and then explores the effect of different conformity thresholds on the level of group cooperation when the return parameters are different.Conformity-driven plays an important role in promoting group cooperation and evolution.We make conformity-driven and payoff-driven coexist in a multi-neighbor lattice network,and then introduce conformity threshold f to study the effect off on the level of cooperation.Our results show that there is always an optimal conformity threshold that maximizes the level of cooperation.Moreover,we find that the optimal conformity threshold depends on the return parameters of the game.In addition,we have tested the robustness of the results and found that the simulation results do not change in conclusion when using different network schemes.