Research On The Supervision Of Private Pension Institutions Based On Evolutionary Game

Due to the grim state of affairs of China’s aging population,the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19 th CPC Central Committee Stressed the improvement once again of the the multiple echelons’ social safeguard setup,Implement a national strategy to actively respond to an aging population.the pension industry,policy-driven,especially private pension institutions,has developed rapidly.However,there are many problems,which need the supervision and regulation of the government.This article aims to improve social welfare,mainly from the perspective of the government,using empirical research methods such as tripartite evolutionary game to explore the comprehensive supervision of private elderly care institutions,and carries out numerical analysis and Simulink simulation to seek effective policies and suggestions.The research carried out in this article has enriched the theoretical significance and has certain value for supervision practice.First,in summarizing modeling evolutionary game theory,basic theory of social welfare,the establishment of government institutions and private pension evolutionary game model,through the analysis of equilibrium and evolutionary stable strategy(ESS),this paper discusses the evolutionary path of the two sides’ strategy choice.It is concluded that the choice of the operating strategy of private elderly care institutions is mainly affected by the success rate of government supervision,the exposure rate,and the degree of penalties for violations of private elderly care institutions.The government should strive to increase the success rate,encourage the public to observe more private elderly care institutions,and increase penalties for private elderly care institutions.Finally,the numerical analysis of MATLAB verifies the correctness of the above conclusions.Secondly,in order to further explore the operation behavior of private pension institutions,we construct a three-party evolutionary game model of the government,private elderly care institutions,and the public.By copying the dynamic equation of the three,the saddle point analysis and evolutionary stability analysis are carried out to explore the government’s regulatory countermeasures for private pension institutions,and perform Simulink numerical simulation.The results show that: the government’s supervision cost and the organization’s operating cost are important factors that affect its strategic choices;the size of the public’s psychological benefits affects the public’s behavior and the public’s "participation" strategy has a certain substitution effect on the government’s regulation.Finally,according to the results of the above model,some conclusions are obtained to provide suggestions for the government’s supervision work;to provide guidance for the operation of private pension institutions;and provide some methods for the public to participate in supervision more effectively.