Information Disclosure,Consumption Preference And Corporate Green Technology Innovation Strategies

With the continuous advancement of my country’s ecological civilization construction and the popularization of the concept of green consumption,the serious economic,environmental and ecological imbalance caused by the traditional extensive economic development model has attracted more and more attention.How to reduce the impact of enterprises on the ecological environment Has become an urgent problem to be solved.The "Thirteenth Five-Year Plan Outline" clearly stated that green innovation is the inevitable choice to solve the problem,and green technological innovation,as the core of green innovation,is a win-win method to effectively solve environmental problems and enhance the company’s own competitive advantage.Green technology innovation is a complex system engineering involving the research and development of green technology and its market application,and its high R&D costs,uncertain innovation efficiency and information asymmetry have an important impact on the willingness of enterprises to green innovation.Based on this,this paper uses bibliometric analysis,utility analysis,game modeling,simulation analysis and other methods to explore the impact mechanism and mechanism of green technology innovation from the perspective of green innovation ecosystem and supply chain.The specific research content is as follows.Firstly,we reviewed the research results of green technology innovation,described the development process,and defined related concepts.According to bibliometric theories and methods,use Citespace software to visualize the development trends and research hotspots in the field of green technology innovation,summarize the driving factors of green technology innovation in enterprises,and explore enterprises from the perspective of innovation ecosystem and supply chain respectively.The impact mechanism and action mechanism of green technological innovation.Secondly,considering the influence of government regulations and information disclosure,the multi-agent evolutionary game study of enterprise green technology innovation.Based on the evolutionary game theory,construct an evolutionary game model between the government,enterprises and financial institutions,explore the mechanism and evolution path of each participant in corporate green technology innovation,and guide corporate information disclosure and financial institution investment through the design of effective government regulations,Provide the best strategy for the green innovation development of the enterprise.Then,the Netlogo simulation platform is used to construct the m-ABM simulation model to verify the effectiveness of the green technology innovation participating in the main strategy selection in different situations.Finally,the python software is used to simulate the impact of various sensitivity parameters on corporate green technological innovation.Research shows that: rationally designing government regulatory strategies can significantly stimulate corporate information disclosure and financial institutions’ investment willingness,and promote the development of corporate green innovation ecosystems.The greater the government’s penalty co efficient for concealing information,the more favorable it is for enterprises to evolve toward public information.When the reward coefficient is moderated,the larger the government reward coefficient for corporate information disclosure and financial institution investment,the more conducive to solving the information disclosure problems and financing dilemmas in corporate green technology innovation.government regulations bring value-added benefits to enterprises,and enterprises give government feedback subsidies.Only when the feedback coefficient is large,both enterprises and financial institutions evolve in the direction of corporate green innovation.Thirdly,research on the coordination strategy of low-carbon technology innovation for supply chain companies considering low-carbon consumption preferences.Based on the joint role of manufacturing companies and retail companies participating in low-carbon technological innovation,a Stackelberg game model of joint decision-making and manufacturing companies-led by both parties is constructed,and the optimal strategies under centralized and decentralized decision-making modes are given,and calculation examples are adopted.Analyze and verify the effectiveness of decision-making,and solve the "double marginal effect" problem of decentralized decision-making in the supply chain by introducing cost sharing contracts.Studies have shown that when the initial carbon emissions of products are relatively small,the increase in low-carbon consumption preferences can prompt manufacturing companies to reduce carbon emissions through low-carbon technological innovation,but the reduction effect of products is more prominent under centralized decision-making,and low-carbon products the market demand is greater,and the profitability of the supply chain is higher.There is a threshold for consumers’ low-carbon preference.When this value is lower,decentralized decision-making is a better strategy;when it is higher than this value,centralized decision-making is a better decision.In view of the "dual marginal utility" problem of decentralized decision-making,designing a reasonable and effective coordination mechanism is a feasible strategy for realizing the effective coordination of manufacturing companies and retail companies participating in low-carbon technological innovation.