Research On The Impact Of Government Subsidies On Investment Efficiency Of New Energy Listed Companies From The Perspective Of Executive Incentives

The new energy industry is an important pioneer in innovation and entrepreneurship.With the declining stock of limited resources,the input and output of new energy has become an increasingly important topic for the entire industry and the country.Effective investment contributes to the continuous rise of business competitiveness.Therefore,how to evaluate and improve the investment efficiency of new energy listed companies has aroused the attention of the government and the public.On the one hand,government subsidies are an important tool used by the state to regulate the macro economy and intervene in the market economy.They play an irreplaceable role in the process of industrial structure transformation and have an important impact on the investment efficiency of enterprises.On the other hand,there are Research shows that executive incentive policies have a significant role in promoting the improvement of corporate investment efficiency.Therefore,the research in this article is devoted to the following purposes: quantitatively evaluate the investment efficiency of listed new energy companies;empirically analyze the impact of government subsidies on the investment efficiency of new energy listed companies and the role of executive incentives in regulating the relationship between government subsidies and investment efficiency;based on government subsidies And executive incentives to put forward countermeasures to improve the investment efficiency of new energy listed companies.First,this article combs the domestic and foreign related literature on government subsidies,executive incentives and investment efficiency,and then analyzes related theories based on information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory,incentive theory and rent-seeking theory.Secondly,based on theoretical analysis,empirical hypotheses are proposed from two levels: the impact of government subsidies on the investment efficiency of my country’s new energy listed companies and the role of executive incentives in regulating the relationship between government subsidies and investment efficiency,and then establish government subsidies,executive incentives,and investment efficiency.The mechanism framework diagram of the relationship between the three.Third,a total of 945 unbalanced panel data of 138 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 are used as research samples to construct a model for evaluating investment efficiency,and on this basis,underinvestment and overinvestment are the explained variables,Government subsidies are explanatory variables,and executive equity incentives and executive compensation incentives are adjustment variables to construct an empirical model.Excel 2010 and statistical software STATA 16.0 are used to conduct empirical analysis on the samples.Finally,the empirical research results: my country’s listed new energy companies have low investment efficiency;government subsidies can alleviate the problem of underinvestment in new energy listed companies,but they will exacerbate the phenomenon of excessive investment in new energy listed companies;executive equity incentives are not positive Promoting the mitigation effect of government subsidies on under-investment,but can inhibit the aggravation of over-investment by government subsidies;executive compensation incentives cannot significantly promote the alleviation of under-investment by government subsidies,but can restrain the aggravation of over-investment by government subsidies.Finally,based on the results of the empirical research,from the perspective of government subsidies and executive incentives,measures to improve the investment efficiency of listed new energy companies are proposed.Among them,the main measures to improve the investment efficiency of listed new energy companies from the perspective of government subsidies include: establishing a guiding mechanism and selecting reasonable subsidies;maintaining market fairness and strengthening information disclosure supervision;monitoring the flow of funds and innovating government subsidies.From the perspective of executive incentives,the main measures to improve the investment efficiency of listed new energy companies include: optimizing the equity structure and improving the executive equity incentive system;optimizing the salary structure and improving the executive compensation incentive system;strengthening spiritual construction and enriching the incentive methods for executives.