The Achievement Backward In IPO Of Yuebo Dongli

Excessive listing threshold triggers IPO(Initial Public Offering)companies ’earnings management behaviors,which has lead to achievement backward in the performance of listed companies.Due to the information asymmetry between listed companies and external investors,managers implement earnings management to meet the listing requirements,increase earnings per share,raise the issue price,and expand the scale of financing.The unsustainability of earnings management has caused achievement backward after IPO,intensified agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and small and medium shareholders,and reduced the efficiency of resource allocation in the capital market.At this stage,China’s IPO system is gradually transitioning from an approval system to a registration system.Information disclosure under the registration system is the core of IPO.Strengthening the information disclosure related to earnings management,and promoting the logical transformation of information disclosure from "full-time government" to "multi-subject sharing",will help give full play to the role of market mechanisms in supervising IPO companies.Therefore,it is of great significance to study the causes of IPO company performance changes,earnings management behavior,and further analyze the governance role of information disclosure on earnings management.This article takes Yuebo Dongli as the research object,adopts normative research method,case research method and empirical research method to analyze the causes of its performance change from earnings management behavior and information disclosure.First,analyze the changes in the operating performance of Yuebo Dongli after its IPO through financial indicators,and use accelerated genetic algorithms to build a projection pursuit model to test the degree of changes in its performance before and after the IPO.It is found that the financial performance of Yuebo Dongli has fallen sharply after its listing;Secondly,based on the demand for listing and financing to analyze its earnings management motivation,the Modified Jones Model and Roy Chowdhury model were used to test its earnings management level,and its earnings management methods were further analyzed from sales manipulation,expense manipulation,and non-recurring gains and losses,and found Yuebo Dongli had a relatively high degree of accrual and real earnings management before the IPO;Finally,analyzing the quality of information disclosure during its IPO process,Yuebo Dongli did not fully disclose changes in customer structure and major sales contracts in the prospectus and financial reports,and did not fully disclose the risk of changes in subsidy policies for the new energy automobile manufacturing industry.Explain it’s cover up the earnings management behavior before listing.The research in this article enriches the related literature on the causes of the performance change of listed companies after IPO.Based on the empirical test of the relationship between earnings management and performance change,the method of combining case and empirical research is used to analyze the motivation and extent of Yuebo Dongli’s pre-IPO earnings management.Analyze with the means,and dig out specific earnings management methods corresponding to abnormal accrued profits,abnormal production costs,and abnormal controllability expenses in the model.The research conclusions of this article will help regulatory agencies to regulate the behavior of listed companies,improve the external supervision of information disclosure of listed companies in the reform of the registration system,optimize the internal governance structure of companies,alleviate the problem of performance changes in the issuance of new shares,and promote the healthy development of the capital market.