A Game Study On Quality Supervision And Rent Seeking Cost Of Disposable Medical Protective Equipment

In 2019,novel coronavirus pneumonia(COVID-19)outbreak has spread to 183countries,with about 39000000 confirmed deaths and about 1100000 deaths.The WHO(WHO)listed it as"public health emergencies of international concern"(PHEIC).The main routes of transmission of NCV are respiratory droplet transmission and contact transmission.Disposable medical protective equipment such as masks are economic and effective protective equipment against respiratory diseases.The World Health Organization said on February 7,2020 that at present,the demand for disposable medical protective articles such as masks is up to 100 times of the normal demand,and the price is more than 20 times higher than the normal price.Under the stimulation of this demand,some manufacturers of disposable medical protective articles are desperate to sell inferior medical protective articles as good ones.As an independent third party,the testing institutions of disposable medical protective articles provide safety and quality testing services for the manufacturers of disposable medical protective articles and the government regulatory departments.However,the manufacturers of disposable medical protective articles rent the third party disposable medical protective articles The behavior of testing institutions occurs from time to time.The high profit of disposable medical protective equipment production and the uncertainty of the duration of the epidemic stimulate the disposable medical protective equipment production enterprises to produce unqualified masks with low cost,less time consuming and simple process requirements.Driven by economic interests,the third-party medical protective equipment testing institutions such as masks participate in rent-seeking,resulting in unqualified masks flowing to the market and increasing epidemic prevention work It’s very difficult.On August 5,2020,the quality and safety monitoring of masks on the market in Beijing found that 18 masks had quality problems;on September 23,2020,the quality and safety risk monitoring of daily protective masks in Liaoning Province found that20 of 30 batches of masks had quality problems.Therefore,based on the current global epidemic situation and Zhong Nanshan’s assertion that there will be a second outbreak in winter,the chance of illegal profit of unqualified disposable medical protective articles still exists.The party and the state have absolute confidence to deal with the sudden quality problems of disposable medical protective articles with huge regulatory demand,but different strategies to deal with these problems will directly affect the quality of disposable medical protective articles When the government supervises the financial expenditure,the government supervision departments choose to govern by doing nothing,let the market develop,and let the market allocate resources.At this time,the financial expenditure is relatively small.When the government supervision departments strictly supervise,they need to intervene in the market in time,reverse the wrong development direction of the market,and invest a lot of human and material resources.At this time,the financial expenditure is relatively large.In view of the rent-seeking phenomenon in the detection of unqualified disposable medical protective equipment,it is of great practical significance to study whether the government should choose the fiscal expenditure direction of loose supervision(loose supervision)or the fiscal expenditure direction of strict supervision(strict supervision).First of all,a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed with disposable medical protective equipment manufacturers,third-party disposable medical protective equipment testing institutions(referred to as the third-party testing institutions)and government regulatory departments as participants.This paper studies the impact of different changes of key factors such as sales revenue,government rewards and punishments,and time loss of disposable medical protective equipment manufacturers on disposable medical protective equipment manufacturers;studies the impact of rewards and punishments for the third party and time loss on the third-party testing institutions;studies the impact on disposable medical protective equipment manufacturers and third-party testing machines The impact of different changes in key factors such as the time of rewards and punishments,the time of business suspension and rectification,the probability of improving the production of qualified disposable medical protective equipment by the manufacturers of disposable medical protective equipment,and the probability of refusing to rent-seeking by the third-party testing institutions on the government regulatory departments.The results show that:(1)the increase of sales revenue,government rewards and punishments and the time loss when the enterprise is punished will increase the probability of producing qualified disposable medical protective equipment.(2)The increase of government regulatory incentives,administrative penalties,and the increase of penalty time loss after the third-party testing institutions intend to rent-seeking will increase the probability of the third-party testing institutions refusing to rent-seeking.(3)On the contrary,excessive rewards will weaken the strength of strict supervision of the government regulatory department,and the higher authorities guide the government regulatory department to strictly supervise the quality of disposable medical protective equipment It is of great significance.Secondly,Lyapunov indirect method is used to analyze the stability of the system.The results show that:(1)under the loose supervision of the government,if the intensity of rewards and punishments is small,the time of business suspension and rectification is short,and the financial expenditure is small,the production of unqualified disposable medical protective equipment by the manufacturer of disposable medical protective equipment can save huge costs,and the third-party testing institutions’income in rent-seeking is low At this time,the strategy combination evolution of disposable medical protective equipment manufacturers and third-party testing institutions will be stable in(producing unqualified disposable medical protective equipment,participating in rent-seeking,strict supervision)and(producing qualified disposable medical protective equipment,refusing rent-seeking,loose supervision).(2)Under the strict supervision of the government,the disposable medical protective equipment manufacturers and the third-party testing institutions play a game with each other.At this time,it should be ensured that the sum of rewards and punishments given by the government supervision departments to the disposable medical protective equipment manufacturers and the third-party testing institutions should be at least greater than the speculative profits of the disposable medical protective equipment manufacturers and the third-party testing institutions,or ensure the safety of the disposable medical protective equipment manufacturers and the third-party testing institutions The difference between the fine for unqualified disposable medical protective equipment produced by secondary medical protective equipment enterprises and the reward for fair testing by third-party medical protective equipment testing institutions such as masks is greater than the cost of government’s strict supervision of financial expenditure,or the fine for participation in rent-seeking behavior by third-party medical protective equipment testing institutions such as masks is equal to the reward for qualified disposable medical protective equipment produced by disposable medical protective equipment enterprises Only when the difference of reward amount of medical protective equipment is greater than the cost of financial expenditure strictly supervised by the government,can the rent-seeking behavior of disposable medical protective equipment manufacturers and third-party testing institutions be prevented.Finally,according to the model,matlab simulation is used to demonstrate R_p、T_g、B_t、F_p、F_t、W_p、W_t、M_p、M_t.The results show that:(1)under the loose supervision of the government,it is difficult to avoid rent-seeking behavior between disposable medical protective equipment manufacturers and third-party testing institutions,so the government should not choose the fiscal expenditure mode of loose supervision;(2)under the strict supervision of the government,reasonable rewards and punishments should be given,Only when the speculative income of disposable medical protective equipment manufacturers and third-party testing institutions is far less than the sum of rewards and punishments,can the quality of disposable medical protective equipment be guaranteed.However,excessive rewards are not conducive to the government’s regulatory function.Therefore,the government should choose the financial expenditure mode of strict supervision.(3)The higher authorities should pay attention to the trend of financial expenditure of the government supervision department to ensure the strict supervision of the government supervision department.