The Signaling Mechanism Of Wedge Strategy

In an anarchic international society,there is uncertainty in the interaction of actors.How to accurately project the image and convey the intention to influence the other party’s cognition and the choice is one of the core issues in the interaction of state actors.Wedge strategy as a strategic behavior is also a process of signal transmission.This article studies the issue of credible signals for wedge strategy.In the wedge strategy,the credible signal should have two characteristics,namely clarity,and expensiveness.When threats and opportunities are easier to identify,elite cognition is easier to reach agreement.When threats and opportunities are not easy to identify,elite perceptions are more likely to diverge.Elite cognitive consistency is the basis for releasing clear signals.The elite has the same cognition and the signals released can be clear and coherent.At the same time,sunk costs and audience costs have formed a certain constraint on the elite.High sunk costs and audience costs make the possibility of releasing bluffs less.Actively adding sunk costs and manufacturing audience costs can make the signal more credible.Clarity and expensiveness together signify the credibility of a signal.In the context of non-deceptive intentions,the clearer,and more credible the signal,the less information is dissipated and the stronger the consensus is,the more accurately the intent of the divider in the wedge strategy can be transmitted,and the influence of the divider’s intention on the target country is reduced,thereby reducing the information.Signal interference caused by dissipation and reducing unintended consequences caused by signal interference.This article selects two cases of American pre-blocking and differentiation Sino-Soviet alliance during the Cold War to verify the credible signal of the wedge theory.In this case,the elite perception of threats and opportunities is relatively divided,and the State Council and the Ministry of Defense often disagree.The State Council’s China policy prefers the adaptive wedge.The Ministry of National Defense considers its policy toward China more from the perspective of military security,and cannot fully agree with the State Council ’s strategic measures.The State Council has to make some compromises from time to time.This made the signal transmission of China’s policy to China unclear during this period.In addition,the United States has not passed China ’s sincerity test and made no substantial concessions to China.Obviously,the US investment in signal costs is not enough.Compared with the insufficient investment in the signal cost of Communist China,the United States provided a large amount of assistance to support Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in the early days,which in fact caused a large amount of sunk costs.In addition,the domestic foreign aid groups in the United States are very powerful,which has also caused certain restrictions on the Truman government’s flexible China policy.These contradictory policy signals have led China to feel that the credibility of the wedge strategy signal sent by the United States is not high.The historical experience of the CCP ’s interaction with the United States also supports this,so it is almost impossible for the United States to prevent the China-Soviet Union from succeeding.In the case of the second Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958,it can be seen that as the alliance between China and the Soviet Union became stronger after the Korean War,for the United States,China ’s threat is more clearly visible,and efforts to differentiate the Sino-Soviet alliance in the short term have also become a bubble.The American elites have generally changed their views on China’s wedge strategy,and it has become the consensus of the American elite to oppose and change the confrontational wedge strategy.The ambiguity of US policy toward China has gradually disappeared.In addition,the anti-communist wave in the United States is on the rise,and groups that are hostile to New China,such as the China Foreign Aid Group and the "Millions of People’s Committee," are very active,which limits the flexibility of the US wedge strategy to China to a certain extent.Therefore,the United States has issued a clear and clear signal to China against the wedge strategy.On the Taiwan question,the United States has adopted large-scale military assistance and military mobilization to help defend Golden Gate and Matsu,as well as incorporating the Taiwan question into domestic political issues,which has made the US confrontation signals costly and increased its credibility.China ’s historical experience with the United States since the Korean War supports this.The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958 exposed the differences between the Sino-Soviet Alliance,and the credible signal transmission of the US wedge strategy during this period made the antagonistic wedge better used.