| With the further development of the market economy,the market economy reform has reached deep-water areas.The market economy has achieved considerable development under the state’s macro-control.Private enterprises play an important role in the market economy.The ownership structure of our private enterprises is highly concentrated and exists.A dominant phenomenon,mainly direct holding,pyramid and cross-holding control,has become a stumbling block on the road to reform of private enterprises.The resulting conflict of interests between major shareholders and small and medium shareholders has become more intense.The agency problem is prominent.Western capitalist countries have more sound legal systems that can alleviate conflicts between the two,while China ’s market economy has a relatively short development time,the legal system is not sound,supervision and management are not in place,and investors ’interests are not good.To effective protection,this leads to the lack of legal restrictions on the actions of the major shareholders.For the benefit of the major shareholders,they may invade the company’s resources,transfer creditors’ funds,hollow out the interests of small and medium shareholders and creditors,and send adverse signals to the market.Misleading public investors.How to solve the hollowing-out behavior of major shareholders,alleviate the contradictions among stakeholders,improve the governance efficiency of the company,effectively protect the interests of public investors,and enable the healthy growth of private enterprises,becoming the first problem to be solved in academia and market economy.As private listed companies play an important role in the market economy,they are taken as the research object.First,from the perspective of the financing scale of debt financing,debt maturity and debt ownership,analyze the impact mechanism on large shareholders’ hollowing out behavior,and then add adjustments.The variable legal environment again analyzes the hollowing behavior of major shareholders,followed by panel data of private listed companies from 2012 to 2017,and conducts empirical research on the relationship between the legal environment,debt financing and hollowing behavior.Finally,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)There is an inverted "U" relationship between the scale of debt financing of China’s privately-owned listed companies and the degree of large shareholders ’hollowing out;(2)Short-term debt does not well suppress the large shareholders’ hollowing out,but in areas with good legal systems,large Shareholders ’hollowing out of short-term debt has been significantly reduced;long-term debt has not played a better role in restraining in areas with a good legal environment,and governance of long-term debt is better than in areas with a bad legal environment;(3)Banks Loans and commercial credits can well suppress the hollowing out of large shareholders.When the regional legal environment is poor,the effect of suppressing hollowing out of large shareholders is stronger.In addition,employees and the government ’s most creditors can also play to a certain extent.The constraint effect of debt on the hollowing out of large shareholders,that is to say,different creditors really play the role of supervision and governance by virtue of their own advantages.At the end of the article,according to the empirical research results,some targeted suggestions are given.On the one hand,private enterprises should build a reasonable debt structure in the process of debt financing and increase the proportion of long-term debt;banks as important creditors should strengthen their Governance and supervision in order to make debt financing play a more important role in corporate governance,improve the company ’s supervision and governance mechanism,and improve governance efficiency.On the other hand,external laws should increase the protection of creditors and small and medium shareholders to promote the legal environment It tends to improve and create a good market environment. |
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