| As an industrial field with high technological content and strong demand for interconnection and standardization,intellectual property rights in the smartphone industry are core elements in the production of enterprises and occupy a pivotal position in the capture of market share.This paper presents a systematic analysis of abuses involving intellectual property rights(especially patent rights)within the cell phone market from both theoretical and practical aspects,in conjunction with monopolistic acts under Article 17 of the Antimonopoly Law,and makes corresponding recommendations at four levels,with a view to obtaining higher quality and predictable rulings in such cases and guiding Chinese enterprises to develop healthily in the global industrial competition.Chapter 1 starts from the characteristics of the smartphone industry chain and introduces the characteristics of patent technology in the conventional stages of R&D,design,manufacturing and assembly in the global value chain,clarifies China’s position in the industry chain,the technical limitations and weak links encountered,and that profit acquisition is not uniform in the smartphone industry chain,and although a direct causal relationship cannot be drawn,it is certain that the acquisition of manufacturer value and intellectual property rights There is a high correlation between vendor value capture and IPR.The smartphone industry,as an industrial field with high technological content and strong demand for interconnection and standardization,is more prominent in the issue of technical standards and intellectual property rights,but the problems in technical standards cannot be simply equated with the abuse of intellectual property rights,and the abuse of intellectual property rights by enterprises is not necessarily regulated by the antitrust law,and only when the abuse of intellectual property rights by operators excludes or restricts competition will it cause a conflict between the antitrust law and The conflict between the antitrust law and the intellectual property law is only caused when the operator’s abuse of intellectual property excludes or restricts competition.In regulating such conflicts,the antitrust law also faces the difficulties of the "fault line" at the level of legal sources,the difficulty of hearing cases,and the disconnection between penalties and individual remedies,including but not limited to the determination of rates and the application of injunctive relief.Chapter 2 focuses on the discussion of IPR abuse under Article 17 from an antitrust perspective,focusing on IPR in the cell phone industry,and analyzes the elements of illegality of the five typical types of abuse of dominant market position specified in the Antitrust Guidelines in the context of Huawei v.IDC,Qualcomm Antitrust,Huawei v.Convince,and the antitrust investigation report issued by the U.S,House of Representatives Judiciary Committee.Chapter 3 analyzes the "other acts" under Article 17.First,loyalty discounts.It also analyzes the possible abuses in the 5G RF chip market in China.If Qualcomm uses loyalty discounts to facilitate exclusive cooperation between cell phone manufacturers and Qualcomm,and uses modem chips to influence RF chips to crowd out competitors in the 5G chip market,China’s enforcement authorities should also Follow up the investigation.Second,the abuse of injunctive relief.Drawing on the ideas of the European Court of Justice in the Orange Book Standard case,Huawei v.ZTE and Sisvel v.Haier,and returning to the actual situation in China,we propose operable conditions for the application of injunctive relief rules.Chapter 4 proposes the improvement of anti-monopoly regulation of intellectual property abuse in China’s smartphone industry chain from the legislative,judicial,law enforcement and industry perspectives.At the legislative level,it is suggested to improve the hierarchy of legal sources;at the enforcement level,it is suggested to focus on the beneficial effects of linkage between administrative penalties and individual remedies;at the judicial ruling level,it is suggested to focus on the determination of the applicable rates of licenses,the applicable rules of injunctive relief and the negotiation framework of patent licenses;at the industry level,it is suggested to position the roles of Chinese enterprises and SSOs respectively. |
