Antitrust Regulation Of Algorithmic Collusion

With the development of digital economy in the world,computer algorithm on the one hand has a profound impact on the commercial society and plays an irreplaceable role in market competition.On the other hand,the application of the algorithm changes the operator’s business model and market structure,thus causing an impact on the market competition order.In this context,algorithm collusion has gradually become a key research topic in global antitrust jurisdictions.From the perspective of anti-monopoly practices,operators’ behaviors of eliminating and restricting competition by using big data algorithms occur frequently,and it is urgent to conduct in-depth theoretical research.However,algorithmic collusion is more subtle and intelligent than traditional monopoly agreements,posing challenges to both antitrust legislation and enforcement.Therefore,in order to improve the regulation of algorithm collusion,it is necessary to review the theory and system of algorithm collusion.First of all,in terms of basic theory,the scope of algorithm collusion can be divided into broad and narrow sense.The research object of this paper is broad algorithm collusion,and its boundary is determined to exclude the unintentional consistent behavior of operators from algorithm collusion.At present,the academic classification of algorithmic collusion is mostly based on the function of algorithms.This paper also follows this classification standard and divides algorithmic collusion into Messenger collusion,Axis and convergence collusion,Implicit collusion and Virtual collusion.In the aspect of the harm of algorithm collusion,the author firstly analyzes the negative effects of algorithm collusion from the perspectives of market,consumers and operators,and draws the conclusion that the anti-monopoly law needs to regulate algorithm collusion.Secondly,in order to explore the optimal path of algorithm collusion regulation,this paper deeply analyzes the three regulatory paths of collusion and the current regulatory system,compares and demonstrates the three paths that can regulate monopoly behavior and algorithm collusion,and obtains the optimal path of algorithm collusion.Then detailed introduction of China’s regulation algorithm collusion of the current system and the status quo of regulation,so as to find the difficulties and deficiencies.Finally,because the participation of algorithms has greatly changed the way of collusion,virtual collusion has even gone beyond the evaluation scope of the current system,resulting in the regulation of algorithmic collusion in the system design and supervision level there are difficulties.In order to solve these problems,this article through the way of case study and comparative study,in the process of fair value in the algorithm of conspiring to regulate priority status,and stressed that draw lessons from the practice of countries outside,expand the system regulation "common dominant market position" tacit collusion,and algorithm of conspiring to subject in behaviorism.This paper calls for strengthening the supervision of algorithm collusion,and suggests that anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies change the supervision concept to adapt to the development of The Times,introduce technical organizations and experts to solve technical problems,and give full play to the management role of industry organizations to assist supervision.