Research On Compulsory Licensing System Of Drug Patent

The issue of access to medicines in developing countries remains unresolved,despite the public health crises of the 21st century.Particularly in the post-TRIPS era,the patent system has tended to adopt a high standard of protection,and systems such as patent linkage or patent term compensation for pharmaceuticals have created new obstacles to it.Due to the outbreak of the new crown epidemic,many countries have taken corresponding measures in relation to compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents,but the theoretical controversies and implementation issues have not yet been resolved,and therefore the status and development path of the system in the new international intellectual property protection environment need to be explored accordingly.The paper is divided into six sections for this study:The preamble introduces the background,significance and current state of research on the system,and explains that the problem to be addressed in this paper is to analyse the theoretical controversies of the compulsory licensing system for pharmaceutical patents and to explore a more suitable way forward for the development of the system in the post-TRIPS era.Chapter 1 introduces the problems of the compulsory licensing system for pharmaceutical patents by introducing the history of the compulsory licensing system,establishing the initial logic of the establishment of the system and drawing out the problems that still exist.The compulsory licensing system was established in the early days to prevent patent abuse.Later on,due to the public health crisis,developing countries realised the adverse effects of the conflicting relationship between patent rights and public health,and after years of debate with developed countries,compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents was finally recognised at the international level.However,the system has been the subject of many years of theoretical controversy due to conflicting national interests,and its implementation has still not fully addressed the issue of access to medicines.Chapter 2 analyses the justification for compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents.Pharmaceutical research and development is a high-risk,high-investment activity,and intellectual property rights give pharmaceutical companies certain monopoly rights,which can easily lead to high drug prices and conflicts between patent rights and public health interests.At this stage of health inequalities,compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents,as a temporary restriction on patent rights,can be used as a response to alleviate the problem of access to medicines.Based on the concepts of human rights and distributive justice,property rights should give way when basic human needs for survival are threatened.Compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents,although justified,should be subject to restrictions,and it is undesirable to make compulsory licensing conditional only on the high price of drugs,taking into account various factors.In terms of theoretical arguments,firstly,patent protection for medicines can have a two-sided impact on public health,and the continued conflict between patent protection and public health may be the result of institutional weaknesses in the principle of the priority of human health.Secondly,for countries or regions with poor economic conditions,innovation is meaningless when the safety of national life is difficult to guarantee.Finally,temporary patent exemptions,while providing quick relief from public health crises,are not conducive to global innovation and development in the long run.Chapter 3 presents an analysis of country examples.Firstly,an overview of global implementation data is presented.The institution has been concentrated in developing countries and has been used mainly for highly transmissible diseases,with a few cases of implementation in developed countries.Many countries have used the system as a threat to coerce companies into lowering prices,and have not implemented it directly.This is followed by an analysis of implementation cases in India,the US and Germany to understand the logic and considerations of national courts.Chapter 4 provides recommendations for the development of the system in the postTRIPS era,as the FTA regime has led to the expansion of some high-standard patent protection mechanisms,and countries need to position the system according to their national circumstances.Countries should be rational in their approach to high-standard patent protection mechanisms and should not just blindly introduce them.For developing countries,they can make full use of the negotiation mechanism and speak out actively to defend their public health rights when agreements are signed between countries or at the international level.Finally,to conclude,a compulsory licensing system for pharmaceutical patents is necessary and justified,but the existence of the system does not necessarily mean that it has to be implemented,and the deterrent effect of the system itself can,to a certain extent,hold the patentee in check and balance the relationship between patent interests and public health.For some developing countries,compulsory licensing is necessary if the high price of medicines would make the country’s population unviable;but for developed countries,compulsory licensing is not a cure in the long run.As China is now moving towards the goal of being "among the most innovative countries",it should take a cautious view on compulsory licensing,encourage technological innovation and impro ve its own research and development capabilities.