Antitrust Regulation Of Big Data Personalized Pricing

With the development of the digital economy,massive data and the big data analyzed from the data are becoming an important information asset,which can create value and cultivate new products and markets through close combination with algorithms.Some science and technology strength,market power,strong platform operators began to rapid development,relying on the information assets big data platform operators using the collected data,through to the old users to take high price,to new users to adopt low cross subsidy way to obtain the higher yields,this behavior is called the big data platform operators kill practice behavior.On the one hand,big data killing behavior can give full play to the role of big data resources,promote the consumption efficiency of consumers,and promote targeted innovation of enterprises.But on the other hand,platform operators abuse the dominant market position,reducing the efficiency of market competition and reducing the consumer surplus.Therefore,it is necessary to use anti-monopoly law to regulate the behavior of big data killing.Using the traditional anti-monopoly principles,concepts and tools to solve the problem of big data rigging will face different degrees of difficulties in the three links of anti-monopoly review system.First of all,in terms of market identification related to the behavior of big data killing,big data products are characterized by bilateral market,network externality and user lock-in effect,and there are many limitations in defining relevant markets with traditional methods.Secondly,in terms of the identification of market dominance,factors such as data collection and data carrying cost of big data may affect operators’ ability to control big data and the competitive effect of big data market.Therefore,traditional examination standards have certain limitations in the identification of market dominance of operators.Finally,in terms of the final review decision,the decision of absolute prohibition and no prohibition cannot achieve the best regulatory effect due to the different choice of welfare standards to determine whether the behavior of big data killing is favorable or not.Based on the analysis of the existing anti-monopoly regulations on the behavior of big data killing rip-off,this paper puts forward relevant suggestions to improve the anti-monopoly regulations on the behavior of big data killing rip-off.First of all,the relevant concepts of big data and big data killing should be clarified,and subsequent analysis and research should be conducted on the basis of effective definition.Secondly,improve the relevant market definition of big data killing behavior,and innovate relevant market definition tools in consideration of bilateral market conditions.Thirdly,it is clear that the market share is not enough to truly reflect the market dominance of the big data market,and the platform operators’ ability to control the data and their dominance in the associated market should be attached importance to,and the market dominance of the platform operators should be comprehensively identified.Finally,due to the problem that the behavior of big data killing riper will lead to the reduction of consumer welfare and the improvement of the total social welfare,the choice of welfare standards should be fully considered in the final review decision,and the effective anti-monopoly regulation on the behavior of big data killing riper should be implemented by adopting reasonable standards.