Research On The Risks And Preventive Countermeasures Of X Company’s"Valuation Adjustment Mechanism"

The "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism",it is a prior agreement made by both parties when they are unable to determine the future performance of enterprises,which first appeared in European and American countries.With the development and improvement of China’s market economy,in order to cope with the fierce market competition,enterprises will not only rely on their own core competitiveness,but also choose financing,merger and reorganization and listing.Therefore,the "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism" emerges as the times require and is widely used in enterprise merger and acquisition activities.As there are many risks in the information asymmetry between the trading entities,it is a worthy research direction to identify the main forms of the risk of "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism" and how to prevent it.In view of the above problems,this paper uses the literature research method and case analysis method to study from the following five aspects:first,for the representative company X in the field of civil service education and training,it combs the "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism" applied in the process of its backdoor listing;secondly,it describes the relevant theory and risks of the "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism";thirdly,it begins to analyze the case of X company’s application of the "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism",and introduces the civil servants Training industry market status and the basic situation of the main body of the "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism",focusing on the analysis of the design and implementation of X company’s "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism" plan and the risk manifestations,the implementation process of company X’s"gambling agreement" is mainly from the motivation of signing the "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism",program design and implementation effect;fourth,analysis the causes of the risk of X company’s "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism",and put forward preventive countermeasures and suggestions;finally,this paper is the conclusion and conclusion of this paper Prospects.Through the above research and analysis,this paper draws four research conclusions:first,the "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism" is affected by the industry policies and relevant laws and regulations;secondly,the risk before signing the "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism" is mainly that the enterprise valuation is inaccurate and the method is not appropriate.Therefore,in the enterprise valuation,we should take a combination of various methods to better achieve risk control.Third,the performance commitment clause of the"Valuation Adjustment Mechanism" can effectively avoid the risk of information asymmetry,but there is the risk of default that can not achieve the performance commitment goal.Therefore,we should set the performance target reasonably,set a variety of compensation methods,and flexibly set the compensation mechanism.Finally,the performance commitment target of the "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism" is too high,and the management will adopt some extreme operating methods under pressure,focusing on the immediate interests and ignoring the long-term interests.The short-term interests may make the enterprise go through the current agreement period,but it is hard to imagine the impact on the development of the enterprise after the end of the term of the "Valuation Adjustment Mechanism".Therefore,the improvement of management and supervision mechanism and the establishment of risk control management team can effectively avoid the occurrence of such phenomena and provide guarantee for the sustainable development of enterprises.