Study On The Incentive Mechanism Of Delayed Retirement Of Enterprises Employees In Shanghai

Shanghai has actively tried to formulate and implement the policy of “flexible delayed pension application”,but due to the lack of specific incentive measures,the number of employees responding to the policy is small.The concept of gradual delayed retirement has not been widely trusted by the public.The key to the successful implementation of the reform of delayed retirement is to establish an internal incentive mechanism.This paper focuses on the employees of Shanghai enterprises who worked before the end of 1992 and retired after the reform of endowment insurance system.Based on the content-based incentive theory,process based incentive theory and behavior based incentive theory,by means of in-depth interview,actuarial analysis,case analysis,this paper analyzes the following four aspects: the interest demands of policy audiences,the calculation of monthly basic pension,the change of monthly income of employees in different retirement decisions,and the measures to improve the incentive mechanism of employees,to analyze the behavior motivation behind the retirement decision-making of enterprise employees,and to analyze the deep reasons for the resistance of the delayed retirement reform.First of all,based on the analysis of the current situation of Shanghai′s delayed retirement reform system,the interview outline is designed according to the need level theory and the two factor theory,and the interest demands of the policy audience are analyzed.Secondly,it constructs the measurement methods of monthly basic pension,individual account pension,transitional pension and adjustment amount,and analyzes the parameters that affect the monthly basic pension income of enterprise employees.Thirdly,through the setting of the relevant parameters of working retirement,the paper analyzes theimpact of statutory retirement,delayed retirement and recessive retirement on the monthly income of employees after retirement.Finally,based on the above analysis and the experience of typical countries′delayed retirement reform incentive measures,this paper puts forward relevant countermeasures and suggestions.The conclusions are as follows: first,the employees are more concerned about whether the delayed retirement can increase their income after retirement,while the enterprises are more concerned about whether the delayed retirement can increase the cost of employment.Second,when the enterprise employees are in retirement,the increase of monthly pension income will only be related to the unified adjustment amount.Third,in the same pension payment year,there is a situation that the pension income of the delayed retirement will be lower than the statutory retirement employees;the recessive retirement employees obtain wage income and pension income at the same time,which hinders the implementation of the delayed retirement reform.In order to promote the delayed retirement reform of Shanghai’s enterprise employees,we should set up multi-faceted incentive measures,aiming at the interest demands of enterprise employees,the behavioral motivation behind different retirement decisions of enterprise employees,and the employment behavior of enterprises,so that enterprise employees are willing to apply for delayed retirement,and enterprises are willing to continue to employ delayed retirement employees,reducing the resistance of the implementation of delayed retirement reform.