Research On Legal Regulation Of Standard Essential Patent Owners' Abuse Of Dominant Market Position

Science and technology are the primary driving force for development.At present,technology research and development companies around the world have combined patented technology with standardization as the best choice in order to better promote their products and expand their influence in related industries.It is precisely because of the rapid development of technical standardization that many monopolistic cases of abuse of standard-essential patents have spawned worldwide.The reason for this problem is that the rights of standard-essential patent holders have not been effectively regulated,which has led to a trend of expansion of rights.However,in practice,in order to maintain the interests of standard-essential patent holders and the stable operation of the relevant market,it is not appropriate to expand the scope of the standard-essential patent rights.It is believed that each standardessential patent can independently constitute the relevant market,and then the standard is deduced.The dominant market position of the essential patent holder.Since the determination of the relevant market and market dominance is the prerequisite for judging whether the standard-essential patent holder has abused the market dominance,the definition of the relevant market of the standard-essential patent and the determination of the market dominance should be more cautious.This article selects Qualcomm's anti-monopoly case as the research object.By analyzing the administrative penalty decision of the anti-monopoly law enforcement agency,it is found that although the patented technology becomes a standard-essential patent,it automatically obtains a certain degree of compulsion,but it does not exclude all market competition.When defining the relevant market,it is necessary to consider the effectiveness,necessity and substitutability of the technology,paying particular attention to whether different standards are substitutable,and whether standard products and non-standard products are substitutable.The method of inferring market dominance directly based on the market share of the standard-essential patent holder is also unreasonable.Instead,the factors of cross-licensing by both parties and the market power of the licensee must be considered.Based on the situation of the individual case,it can also be judged comprehensively.To a certain extent,avoid the disadvantages caused by the uncertainty of the definition of the relevant market,and improve the accuracy of the determination of market dominance.The lack of rationality in the determination of abuse of market dominance is mainly reflected in two aspects: the unreasonable determination of the independence of tied-sale patents and the unreasonable determination of unfair and high-priced behaviors.Regarding the unreasonable determination of the independence of tying patents,you can try to solve the problem from the perspective of the needs of the licensee.If there are other patents in the market for the licensee to choose freely,and the other patents are the same as the tying patent Effect,which means that the standard essential patents and the tied-sold patents are independent of each other;Regarding the unreasonable determination of unfair high prices,the assumption of bilateral negotiation can be used to simulate the negotiation process between the two parties on the license fee rate,and then the FRAND license fee rate can be calculated.You can also try to compare the license fee rate with the fee rate calculated based on the FRAND principle,or compare it with the license fee rate before the patent is included in the standard.