Mechanisms For Cellular Traffic Offloading With Optimized Profit

The explosive growth of cellular traffic poses great challenges to mobile network.When the cellular traffic that needs to be transmitted exceeds the load capacity of the mobile network,the overloaded traffic will reduce the quality of service of the mobile network and the efficiency of the whole network.Leveraging the idle resources of existing alternative networks,such as femtocell and WiFi networks,is a promising solution to alleviate the severe traffic overload problem faced by mobile network operators.However,third-party networks often need to provide services for their own users,and third-party networks will consume their own bandwidth and power resources when providing offloading services.As a result,third-party network owners will hardly contribute their spare resources free of charge.In order to incentivize third-party network owners to participate in the traffic offloading market,it is necessary to motivate thirdparty network owners.Auction mechanism is a commonly used method to achieve cellular traffic offloading.At present,most existing mechanisms for cellular traffic offloading assume that the mobile network operators have knowledge of incoming overloaded traffic demand,and can satisfy the demand by offloading.However,in real life,due to the explosive growth of cellular traffic,the capacity of third-party network may not meet the offloading demand of mobile network operators.Naturally,mobile network operators want to maximize their profits.In this paper,the profit of mobile network operators is the difference between the revenue from providing traffic services to mobile users and the cost of purchasing offloading services from third-party network owners.But in the process of the auction mechanism,some honest-but-curious sellers may snoop on the private information of other sellers.The leakage of private information will result in sellers'unwillingness to participate in the offloading market,thus affecting the efficiency of the whole market.In addition,in the Internet environment,mobile network operators do not know the number of third-party network owners with idle resources,so they need to decide whether to purchase offloading services from the third-party network owners immediately after they submit the bid.The main work of this paper is summarized as follows:1)based on the idea of random sampling profit extraction,a new competitive mechanism is proposed.The theoretical analysis shows that the mechanism satisfies truthfulness and individual rationality,and the method of competitive analysis shows that the mechanism has performance guarantee;2)to protect sellers'privacy,we propose a differential privacy mechanism that satisfies approximate truthfulness,individual rationality and e-differential privacy;3)to solve the problem that mobile network operators need to decide whether to purchase offloading services from third-party network owners immediately after receiving the bid,we propose a new online mechanism based on the idea of two-stage sampling and prove that the mechanism meets the requirements of truthfulness and individual rationality,and the performance is guaranteed;4)we also designe and conduct simulation experiments which show that these mechanisms have good performance.