| In recent years,the mobile phone industry has developed very rapidly,and consumers’ demand for mobile phones has also ranged from quality to performance and charging speed.At the same time,mobile phones are updated quickly,and competition in the mobile phone market is also fierce.In order to meet the needs of consumers and gain more market share,mobile phone manufacturers and telecom operators have begun bundling sales and jointly launching contract mobile phones.Bundling sales has also become an important operating model in the mobile phone supply chain.According to the research of scholars,the research of bundling sales in the mobile phone supply chain usually considers the network externalities benefits of telecom operators,but does not consider the diseconomies of scale in the production of some mobile phone manufacturers.Therefore,the article adds diseconomies of scale on the basis of considering network externalities.The article constructs a decentralized decision model and a centralized decision model led by mobile phone manufacturers and telecom operators to solve the optimal decision.Next,the article analyzes the influence of network externalities,diseconomies of scale,and consumer price sensitivity coefficients on optimal decision-making,and compares the optimal decision-making of different decision-making models and the results of two decentralized decision-making.Discuss the influence of different dominant models on the decision-making of the mobile phone supply chain.On this basis,the design of a "revenue-sharing joint subsidy" contract realizes the coordination of decentralized decision-making.Finally,summarize the conclusions of the article,put forward the management enlightenment of the mobile phone supply chain bundling sales,and give the research outlook.The findings show that:(1)Comparing with the benchmark model,it can be seen that network externalities have significantly increased product prices,product sales,and system profits.Under the influence of network externalities,the total profit of mobile phone supply chain is not affected by the leading enterprises.(2)Under the decentralized decision-making of the influence of network externalities and diseconomies of scale,the total profit of the system led by mobile phone manufacturers and telecom operators is no longer equal,and the profit of the system led by mobile phone manufacturers is higher.The negative impact of diseconomies of scale on the profits of the mobile phone supply chain is greater than the profit growth brought about by network externalities.At the same time,when the mobile phone manufacturer is in a subordinate position,the negative impact of diseconomies of scale is even greater.(3)Considering the actual operation of mobile phone supply chain,a "revenue sharing joint subsidy" contract is designed.Mobile phone manufacturers and telecom operators share profits,and telecom operators re-set the subsidy price to achieve system coordination.Based on the consideration of network externalities and diseconomies of scale,this article studies the pricing decisions of bundled sales in the mobile phone supply chain,and analyzes the impact of different leading companies on contract mobile phone prices and system profits.This not only enriches the theoretical basis of bundled sales in the mobile phone supply chain,but also provides a reference for pricing decisions in the mobile phone supply chain.The article provides management enlightenment for mobile phone manufacturers,telecom operators and their cooperation,with the purpose of promoting the continuous growth of corporate profits and the stable and healthy development of the system. |