From Phenomenal Concept Strategy To Representationalism

On the ontological status of phenomenal characteristics of conscious i.e.qualia,there are intense debates between physicalism and anti-physicalism,which is directly involved in the core of mind-body problem.By adopting the phenomenal concepts strategy(PCS),I provide a detailed analysis of the concept of qualia and to defend the physicalist position by responding to various anti-physicalist criticisms.By further adopting a transcendental argument,I can fully defend an acquired physicalism on the premise of accepting the dualism intuition,which not only defence the physical monism at the ontological level,but also bridges the explanatory gap at the epistemological level.However,confront Chalmers’ master argument,it is difficult to response the argument only in PCS’s framework.I try to adopt a theory of mental representation to discriminate meta-representation from representation,so that I can make representationalism’s externalism standpoint compatible with PCS’s internalism standpoint.Further,I can explain mental subject’s epistemic situation to reject the dilemma posted by the master argument.The result of this work enables the scientific research of consciousness to unload the burden of "hard problems" and cross the explanatory gap legitimately,it also has practical significance on how we view issues on machine consciousness and machine ethics.