A Research On Cooperative Behavior Of Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Considering Strategy Acceptability

Cooperative behavior in group life is ubiquitous.From the stone age of primitive society to the industrial age of modern society,science and technology continue to develop,and cooperation is the constant theme.However,in the process of social development,there is a conflict between cooperation and defection.Cooperators sacrifice their own interests to maximize the collective interests,while defectors encroach on the interests of others to maximize their own interests.This phenomenon is known as social dilemma.Evolutionary game theory,an important tool for solving social dilemmas,provides theoretical support for understanding the diversity of cooperative behavior in complex networks.The emergence,development and stability of cooperation in complex networks have attracted the attention of many researchers.Scholars have studied the evolution of cooperation by combining macro methods with micro models,and carried out in-depth research on cooperation mechanisms.Among them,emotional evolutionary mechanisms and network reciprocity mechanisms have been studied for many years and have been proved to be effective in promoting cooperation.From the perspective of practice and theoretical research,individuals are complex of sensibility and rationality,and individual psychological activities can affect the evolution of cooperation.Firstly,this thesis considers the evolution of cooperative behavior on a single-layer network,and acceptability(acceptance or support)of an individual’s strategy in real-life situations affects individual strategy updating,which introduces the average acceptability of individuals and their immediate neighbors in the process of individual selection of strategies.The unit change of acceptability is used as a variable to represent the overall rationality.On the basis of the model rules,we get the Monte Carlo simulation results as follows:individuals who pay more attention to the average acceptability can promote the cooperative behavior in the system,and rational individuals are beneficial to cooperation under low temptation.The new model which introduces acceptability combined with the actual situation effectively promotes the development of cooperation compared with the traditional model.Secondly,this thesis considers the evolution of cooperative behavior on a double-layer network.Based on the fact that individuals with leadership or high social influence in real life are the wind vane of social trends,individuals are divided into leaders and ordinary people.In this thesis,we set up a leader layer network and a common layer network to simulate real-life interaction behaviors by mutually influencing between the two layers.Monte Carlo simulation results show that with the increase of the weight coefficient,the proportion of cooperators in the leader-layer also increases.However,the evolution of the cooperation frequency of the lower network is the opposite to that of the upper network,especially when the weighting factor approaches 1.We only need to increase the temptation value slightly,and the common layer evolves into a state of defection.Finally,based on the research,we puts forward prospects for future research to provide new perspectives for related studies.We make rational model assumptions to explore the evolution of cooperation under the information sharing mechanism with the cooperation willingness of cooperators as the starting point.