Countermeasures Of Capital Appropriation By Controlling Shareholders Of Listed Companies

At present,the number of listed companies in our country’s capital market is increasing quickly,injecting new vitality into the market economy.In the most listed companies,there are controlling shareholders with absolute control rights.These controlling shareholders firmly grasp the control rights and information advantages.They occupy the funds of the listed company,convey their own interests through various hidden methods and escape supervision by various means of opportunism.Consequently,it not only does harm to the interests of minority shareholders,but also affects the normal operation of listed companies and the capital market.It not only reflects the internal defects of listed companies,but also reflects the insufficient supervision of our country’s capital market.Therefore,the specific ways in which the controlling shareholder of the listed company occupies funds and how to avoid this behavior is the key content of this paper.After consulting relevant domestic and foreign documents,this paper sorts out the motivations,methods,consequences and governance measures of capital occupation by the controlling shareholders of listed companies.It also analyses the motivations,ways and performance impacts of shareholder capital appropriation.Then,taking Antai Group as an example,through the study of Antai Group’s share structure,governance structure,related parties and the review of the controlling shareholder’s occupation of Antai Group’s funds,it is found that the controlling shareholder’s capital occupation methods include capital occupation through related transactions,related parties indirectly borrowing funds,swapping assets unfairly and providing guarantees for related parties.The consequences of capital appropriation have a negative impact on the solvency,profitability,operating capacity and growth capacity of Antai Group,From the non-financial perspective,it also has a negative effect on the market reaction and the corporate governance.Finally,the governance countermeasures of the controlling shareholder’s capital occupation in the listed company are proposed,which are mainly elaborated from five aspects:improving the company’s internal governance,optimizing the company’s internal control,promoting the transformation of the company’s development mode,improving the quality of the company’s information disclosure and strengthening external supervision and punishment.