Research On The Identification Of Moral Hazard Under The Background Of Medical Insurance Integration Between Urban And Rural Residents And Relevant Regulation Policy

In recent years,the state has vigorously deepened the reform of the medical security system.As a significant part of the medical security system,basic medical insurance has also undergone significant changes.In 2016,the state issued relevant documents to announce integrate the Urban and Rural medical insurance,in order to further effectively improve the medical insurance treatment level of rural residents and ensure the fairness of residents’ rights of the basic medical insurance.However,information asymmetry,as the root cause of moral hazard in the medical field,is an obvious problem in the medical market all the time.The existence of moral hazard in the medical field will lead to the waste of medical resources and the inefficiency of the reform of the medical insurance system.The moral hazard be effectively contained is the key to measure efficiency of the medical insurance reform and the health of the medical market operation.Based on this,the paper takes the integration of the medical insurance policy for urban and rural residents issued in 2016 as the entry point.First of all,the theoretical analysis of the regulatory bases on generation mechanism of moral hazard in the medical field and its adverse effects.Then,through the analysis of the utility function of the medical service demander and the medical service supplier,we conduct a theoretical analysis of the generation of moral hazard before and after.Furthermore,the paper ues the micro survey data of China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study(CHARLS)in order to look into the impact of the integration of the medical insurance on prior health behavior and medical expenses.Finally,according to the assumptions of the theoretical model and the results of empirical analysis,the paper puts forward the regulatory policy recommendations based on three main bodies includes the medical service supplier,the medical service demander and the medical market.The main component of this paper include as follows:1.Analysis of the regulatory of the integration of the residents’ medical insurance.The medical insurance system established on the dual system of urban-rural division,and the level of the medical insurance system has not be effectively improved between urban and rural areas since it been reformed.The moral hazard caused by the characteristics of the medical market and the "profit seeking" behavior of the medical supplier and demander leads to the inefficient allocation and utilization of medical resources and hinder the development of social medical insurance.Therefore,in order to maintain the fairness of medical resource allocation and the efficiency of utilization,medical market needs the regulation of the government.2.Theoretical model analysis of the impact of the moral hazard of the urban-rural residents’ medical insurance integration in the medical market.Both the demander and the supplier of medical services,as a rational person,pursue the maximization of their own effectiveness.The paper respectively constructs the utility function of the medical suppliers and demander,then under the condition of maximizing the first order utility,the paper respectively analyzes the impact of the increase of the medical expense reimbursement ratio on investment of the disease prevention and the demander’s excess medical demand and the supplier’s total medical supply.All in all,explore the impact of the medical insurance conversion on the moral risk of the medical market.3.Empirical model analysis of the impact of the moral hazard of the urban-rural residents’ medical insurance integration in the medical market.Using the micro survey data of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study(CHARLS),the paper studied and analyzed the impact of the integration of urban-rural residents’ medical insurance on prior health behavior and medical expenses.Then,further identified the source of moral hazard.Meanwhile,the sub sample regression is based on the differences between the education level of the sample and the local economic development level.4.Build a multi-subject moral hazard regulation model in the medical field.According to the above research conclusions,the paper proposes policy inspiration for improving the regulatory effectiveness based on medical service supplier,medical service demander and medical market,mainly including building a long-range incentive and restrictive salary system,establishing a medical service information regulation system,improving public regulation and feedback channels,strengthening public awareness of self health,setting up independent medical regulation institutions and building a "whole process" vertical regulation system for medical resources.The innovation of this paper is reflected in the following three points based on the above research:1.Expanded the utility function theory model of moral hazard identification between medical service demander and medical service supplier.Using the utility functions of the medical service demander and the medical service supplier,the paper proves that the integration of urban and rural residents’ medical insurance will lead to the moral hazard through full differential formula analysis,which enriches the theoretical model research of moral hazard identification in the medical field.2.Empirically tests the existence of moral hazard caused by the integration of urban and rural residents’ medical insurance.The paper uses panel data of two years to probes into the impact of the integration of medical insurance for urban and rural residents on moral hazard,and further confirms that the medical service supplier is the main source of moral hazard.3.Put forward suggestions on optimizing the regulation mechanism of moral hazard in the medical field.It is beneficial for the government to improve the medical insurance integration between urban and rural residents,prevent the occurrence of moral hazard in the medical field,and provide good theoretical support to achieve the effectiveness of regulation.The paper propose regulatory policy recommendations that conform to the moral hazard in the medical insurance field in our country from the perspective of the side of the medical services demander,medical services supplier,and the medical market.