Research On Antitrust Regulation Of The Behavior Of Refusing Data Opennes

In the platform economy,data has become a key source of competitive advantage for enterprises.Currently,large platforms take advantage of data and adopt technical means to refuse to open data and restrict competitors’ access to data,which is a frequent occurrence.In view of this,the first part of this paper adopts the empirical analysis method and summarizes the following legal issues in practice by sorting out the typical cases involving data opening: firstly,there is a divergence of views on whether the antitrust law can regulate data opening,i.e.whether the antitrust law should compel the monopolist to share competitive advantages with competitors and how to weigh the contradiction between data opening and freedom of operation;secondly,whether data constitutes an essential Second,whether data constitute essential facilities is still controversial,and whether the principle of essential facilities can be applied to regulate data openness;third,the legitimate reasons for refusing to open up are still to be clarified,and the legitimate reasons under the current law lack privacy protection and fail to reflect the characteristics of data competition and dynamic innovation in the platform economy.The second part argues for the justification and necessity of antitrust law to regulate the refusal of data openness in terms of the competitive implication of data and the anti-competitive effects of refusing data openness.The main points include the fact that data is increasingly becoming a key source of competitive advantage,and that factors such as network effects and scale effects will strengthen market power,making refusal to open up data a significant anticompetitive effect,such as inhibiting information sharing and raising barriers to entry.However,at the same time,the refusal to open up is a specific manifestation of the operator’s freedom of operation to prevent competitors from taking advantage of it,which is inherently commercially justified,and its anticompetitive effect and justification should be evaluated by applying antitrust regulation.The third part will discuss the regulatory standards of refusal to open data,and there are mainly two standards for determining the illegality of the subjective intent standard and the essential facilities principle.The essential facilities principle does not follow the logic of competitive harm,and there is a conflict between data and necessity and the potential negative effects such as disincentives,thus the application of the principle of necessity is not feasible.The fourth part will explore whether violation of platform rules and protection of consumer privacy can be justified as grounds for denying data openness based on the defenses commonly asserted in the platform economy,and clarify that reasonable platform rules serve the benign governance function of preventing externalities,and that platforms within the platform economy are committed to accessing critical data that has shifted from enterprise data to consumer data.The fifth part will summarize and improve the antitrust regulatory path of refusing data openness around the jurisprudential and normative levels.At the theoretical level,it is necessary to clarify that monopolistic platforms are not obliged to compel openness in principle,but the anti-competitive effect of the conduct should be the key premise for imposing the obligation of openness;at the same time,due to the potential risks and obstacles of applying the principle of essential facilities to data,the system should be applied with caution and return to the competition damage assessment mechanism.At the level of institutional improvement,firstly,the Antitrust Guidelines on the Platform Economy clearly introduce provisions regulating the refusal to open up data,and conduct case-by-case analysis around the framework of competition damage assessment,instead of being bound to defining whether data is indispensable;secondly,the prevention of externalities as a platform rule defense and the protection of consumer privacy expectations as a privacy protection defense shall be explicitly included in the scope of justification in the Guidelines to properly respond to the competitive nature of the platform economy,thus effectively incorporating the refusal of data openness into the regulatory framework of antitrust law.