Research On The Legal Issues Of Holding Shares On Behalf Of Listed Companies

With the continuous development of security economy and capital market in our country,influenced by factors such as the interest and dodging effect of civil and commercial subjects,share holding behavior occurs frequently in our country,which causes many problems that are difficult to be solved in legal practice and cases with inconsistent results.Among them,the legal problems of holding shares in listed company have become difficult in theoretical research and judicial practice.Compared with foreign countries and regions,Chinese securities market started late.At the present stage,there is a lack of research and regulation experience on the legal problems arising from securities economy and stock market,including insufficient and in-depth research on the share holding of listed companies.For many years,the cases and disputes caused by the phenomenon of proxy holding have been increasing.However,the research and practice of the legal problems of the holding of shares of listed companies are hesitant.At present,in the legislative regulation of our country,only part of the judicial interpretation to limited liability company stock proxy holding to give a clear and affirmative answer,but for the listed company stock proxy holding issues lack a direct and clear regulation in the legal aspects.Due to the lack of explicit legal provisions,civil subjects do not have clear behavioral expectations in dealing with the problems of the validity and the subsequent income distribution of the listed companies’ share holding on behalf of companies.Driven by the fluke mentality and the instinct of benefiting from the violation of harm,Many civil and commercial subjects may choose to hold shares on behalf of listed companies to pursue the maximization of personal interests due to practical causes such as circumventing the restrictive provisions of laws,realizing illegal purposes and intentions,and realizing commercial interests.On the level of administrative supervision,the CSRC,in line with the principle of protecting the interests of investors and the basic concept of maintaining the safety of financial market transactions,insists on taking the specific requirements of information disclosure standards in departmental rules as the judgment standard and sticks to the strict requirement of penetrating supervision to hold a unified negative evaluation on the agent behavior of listed companies.However,at the level of judicial adjudication,when dealing with cases and disputes related to entrusted holding of shares of listed companies,the people’s courts do not have uniform results in determining the validity of entrusted holding behaviors or agreements,nor do they have consistent judgment standards for the distribution of income and loss from share investment.This not only leads to different judgments in the same case,but also leads to different attitudes in the identification of administrative supervision and judicial review.It makes the civil and commercial subject’s expectation of the listed company’s share holding behavior more ambiguous and difficult to distinguish.Therefore,this paper will,based on the existing legal provisions and practical status,through the basic theory and practical situation of listed companies’ share holding agent,analyze the identification criteria of the effectiveness of listed companies’ share holding agent behavior,and put forward the opinion that the judgment of listed companies’ share holding agent behavior should uphold the principle of invalid.At the same time,based on the analysis of the foregoing cases and the theory,point out the problems in the three levels of legislative provisions,judicial trial and administrative supervision,and draw lessons from the foreign countries and regions of the system norms and management experience,to put forward suggestions in view of the existing problems,hoping to contribute his own strength to the effective regulation of stock holding of listed company in our countryThe main structure of this paper is as follows: The first chapter summarizes the basic theories of share entrusting of listed companies,and makes a detailed analysis of the connotation,types,legal basis and practical causes of share entrusting of listed companies,laying the groundwork for the subsequent analysis of the basic theory.The second chapter analyzes and discusses the overseas regulations on stock proxy holding of listed companies,and discovers the institutional advantages and management experiences of overseas countries and regions,which can provide reference for the theoretical enrichment and practical research of our country.The third chapter elaborated on the legislative and judicial status quo of share holding by listed companies,supplemented by the case statistics information obtained by big data retrieval,and then selected some typical cases to explain the different rules of share ownership and interest distribution after the people’s court recognized the effect of behavior,and found the shortcomings in our legal practice.Chapter four summarizes the problems displayed in the first three chapters,and puts forward the existing problems of legal provisions,judicial judgment and departmental supervision in our country to the regulation of listed company’s share holding behavior at present.The fifth chapter,in view of the problems in legal provisions,judicial adjudication and administrative supervision raised in the fourth chapter,puts forward corresponding countermeasures and improvement suggestions,hoping to promote the system improvement and further development of the research on legal problems of share holding of listed companies.