Legal Regulation Of Abuse Of Dominant Market Position By Consumer Platforms

With the passage of time,antitrust laws designed for the industrial economy half a century ago are no longer suitable for the 21st-century economic environment.Half a century ago,colleagues from the Bork and Chicago schools formulated economic theories for the industrial economy,with antitrust laws being a key component.However,over the past 50 years,the share of manufacturing in the GDP of major countries worldwide has decreased by more than half,and the development of digital technology has driven the rapid growth of consumer-facing industries,creating new forms of market competition,such as the rise of platform economy.Today,consumer-oriented companies have unprecedented scale,such as tech giants Apple,Microsoft,Amazon,Facebook,Google,Alibaba,and Tik Tok.The development of digital technology has led to the rise of platform economy,creating tremendous network effects,making platforms that gather billions or even tens of billions of consumers more feasible in the industrial era.However,there is a power imbalance between platforms and participants,making it difficult for participants to bear the transaction costs brought by platforms,and market competitiveness and fairness may also be compromised.Therefore,measures need to be taken to balance the power relationship between platforms and participants,maintain market competition and innovation,and achieve more equitable economic development.Currently,China has introduced a series of legal documents such as the "Anti-Monopoly Law","E-commerce Law",and "Anti-Monopoly Guidelines in the Platform Economy Field" to maintain fair market competition,protect the rights and interests of consumers and merchants,and promote the sustainable and healthy development of the economy.However,traditional analytical methods seem to struggle in the face of the diverse characteristics of consumer platforms.To solve these problems,China should optimize the existing system and effectively manage the abuse of market dominance by consumer platforms based on antitrust laws.In this regard,I propose the following suggestions:First,with regard to the adjustment of law enforcement concepts,the previous principle of inclusive and prudent law enforcement needs to be adjusted,and a new antitrust regulatory principle should be established to coordinate a unified law enforcement system,grasp the benign interaction between competition and innovation,and achieve normalized law enforcement.These improvements and optimizations will help achieve the healthy and stable development of the platform economy.Second,when defining the relevant market,it should be considered whether consumer platforms use the characteristics of multi-sided markets for differentiation,and pay attention to non-price factors and various roles of data in platform operations.With the help of economic analysis methods,innovative approaches to analyzing the relevant market for consumer platforms’ free business models should be explored.Additionally,in response to the challenges faced by relevant market analysis in the consumer platform economy,it is proposed that market definition is only a means and should not be regarded as a necessary prerequisite for case review.Third,when determining market dominance,it is suggested that the number of users and user activity be used as one of the criteria for judging whether a consumer platform has market dominance.A comprehensive assessment should also consider factors such as the platform’s control over data,user experience and satisfaction,vertical integration capabilities,and the platform ecosystem.This will help ensure the accuracy and fairness of judgments.Fourth,in the determination of abusive behavior,it is necessary to improve the recognition standards for price abuse,tying,restrictive behavior,and refusal to trade.When assessing price abuse,first,the definition of "same conditions" needs to be clarified,including factors such as transaction scale,transaction region,and payment conditions;second,cost factors should be fully considered in analyzing price abuse,and reasonable cost differences do not constitute abuse;finally,legitimate business strategies and abusive behavior should be distinguished,such as preferential prices for new customers or specific periods,which generally belong to legitimate business strategies.These principles will help make reasonable judgments when assessing consumer platform price abuse.For tying behavior implemented by consumer platforms,first,it emphasizes that law enforcement agencies should adhere to the case-by-case principle,focusing on reasonableness as the core,analyzing the substantive harm to competition caused by tying behavior,and comparing its positive and negative effects.Second,it proposes specific recognition standards,including confirming market dominance,analyzing whether products can be sold separately,examining the degree of coercion,and assessing the impact on market competition and consumer interests.Through these recognition standards,antitrust law enforcement agencies can make more reasonable and fair decisions in specific cases.When dealing with restrictive trading behavior,namely the "either-or" behavior,first,it emphasizes that antitrust law enforcement agencies should adhere to the principle of prudent law enforcement and comprehensively analyze the positive and negative effects of "either-or" behavior.Second,in practical operation,three aspects of analysis principles are proposed: assessing the impact of behavior on market competition,analyzing changes in consumer interests,and comprehensively considering the positive and negative effects of behavior.Only when the negative effects significantly outweigh the positive effects should the behavior be considered as an abuse of market dominance.In the case of refusal to trade behavior by consumer platforms,first,clarify the principles and methods for identifying essential facilities,drawing on the European Union’s "gatekeeper" system;second,refine the provisions for additional considerations for refusal to trade;third,clarify and refine blocking behavior;finally,clarify the logic of competition damage and establish the factors to be considered in determining the illegality of refusal to trade.These measures will help improve law enforcement and judicial efficiency,protect market competition,and consumer interests.