Information Disclosure Regulation Of Listed Companies

After more than 20 years of development,China’s securities market ushered in the implementation of the registration system.Our country has made some achievements in the information disclosure supervision of listed companies.Still,with the deepening of reform,it is urgent to perfect and perfect the Securities Law and its legal system.First,it examines the public interest theory,the captive supervision theory,the supply and demand regulation theory and their applicability to our country.The regulation theory of information disclosure of listed companies should pursue the unity of the value of order,equality,and efficiency and implement the basic principles of fairness,justice,openness,efficiency,and appropriateness in the whole process of the rule of law.It also lays the theoretical foundation for the research on the regulatory system of information disclosure of listed companies.Secondly,our country’s regulatory legislation for information disclosure of listed companies is relatively dispersed.There are areas for improvement in supervision,the allocation of supervision rights,the effectiveness of information disclosure,the incentive of whistleblowers,the short-selling mechanism,the education of individual investors,and the internal governance of listed companies.Thirdly,the supervision system of information disclosure in foreign countries started earlier,and the comparative analysis of their supervision systems is helpful to the reform of our system.The American regulatory concept keeps pace with The Times,the authority of the regulatory subject is clear,and it is effective in the effectiveness of information disclosure,the incentive and protection system of whistleblowers,and the short-selling trading mechanism and institutions.The Japanese system has advantages in information disclosure legislation,reasonable division of investors,and in-depth supervision of internal corporate governance.The EU system is more mature regarding investor differentiation and internal controls.Finally,it is necessary to establish the concept of information disclosure supervision that considers stakeholders.Improve the legislation on the powers and responsibilities of regulatory bodies from the aspects of clarifying the scope of powers and duties of regulatory bodies and reshaping the forms of responsibility of intermediary institutions;The effectiveness of information disclosure is improved by establishing "simple Chinese rules," showing unified information identification system and perfecting short-selling mechanism.To improve whistleblowers’ protection and reward mechanism,we should strengthen legislative protection,establish the anonymous reporting system and explore the reward system of penalty and forfeiture.Strengthening investor education in three parts: improving the pertinence of investor education,reasonably dividing the compulsory subject of investor education,and well allocating the investor education resources in national education;The supervision at the level of corporate governance is introduced from three ways:consolidating the legal basis of supervision intervention in corporate governance,perfecting the supervisory role of independent directors and supervisors,and giving play to the supervisory and relief role of trade unions.To solve the problem of information disclosure supervision of listed companies in our country and promote the healthy and stable development of China’s securities market under the registration system.