Research On The Tunneling Behavior Of St Tianrun’s Major Shareholder And Prevention Research

Due to the existence of large shareholders and minority shareholders interests conflict,the big shareholders often occupy the interests of minority shareholders in order to control the private returns,big shareholders’ tunneling usually occurs in the high ownership concentration,weak internal control environment of the enterprise,the tunneling to the enterprise and the market are causing very bad influence.It is of great significance to restrain the tunneling behavior to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders and stabilize the market.However,there is no measure to completely eliminate the tunneling behavior of major shareholders.Therefore,it is necessary to continuously study and explore the tunneling behavior of major shareholders,so as to improve the supervision and governance of enterprises’ internal and external tunneling behavior of major shareholders.In this thesis,on the basis of principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and proprietary control theory,literature research method and case study method are used to study the tunneling behavior of ST Tianrun’s controlling shareholders.First of all,the motivation and opportunity of ST Tianrun’s controlling shareholders to carry out the tunneling behavior are analyzed.This thesis believes that the motivation of ST Tianrun’s controlling shareholders to carry out the tunneling behavior mainly lies in the poor operating conditions of the controlling shareholders themselves and the existence of equity collateral that has reached the balance line;The chances of tunneling by controlling shareholders lie in their high shareholding ratio,imperfect internal governance structure,large defects in internal control,imperfect disclosure mechanism,lagging external supervision and insufficient punishment for violations.Secondly,it explains in detail how controlling shareholders occupy the interests by means of appropriation of funds and illegal guarantee.Finally,the economic consequences caused by the tunneling behavior are analyzed from three perspectives :(1)the influence of the tunneling behavior of major shareholders on the operating status of the enterprise is measured through the analysis of relevant financial indicators.This thesis believes that the tunneling behavior has caused ST Tianrun’s insufficient debt paying ability and reduced profitability;(2)The influence of tunneling of major shareholders on enterprise value is measured by calculating and comparing Tobin’S Q value.The decrease of Tobin’s Q value indicates that the enterprise value of ST Tianrun is damaged by tunneling behavior of controlling shareholder.(3)analysis of stock price trends,and uses the event study method to study the stock market reaction to enterprise tunneling announcement,the stock prices during the big shareholders tunneling and declining tunneling behavior after the announcement,announcement to falling accumulation of excess earnings in the future,the stock market showed negative reaction to the controlling shareholder’s tunneling behavior,therefore,this thesis holds that the minority shareholders suffer losses in the stock market due to the tuneling behavior of the controlling shareholder.Based on the analysis of the tunneling motivation and opportunity of ST Tianrun’s controlling shareholder,this thesis puts forward some reference suggestions to weaken the tunneling motivation and curb the tunneling behavior of major shareholders from the aspects of internal governance,improvement of internal control,external supervision and rights protection of small investors.Internal governance measures include strengthening equity checks and balances,optimizing the mechanism of independent directors,increasing the diversity of the board of directors,meanwhile,improving the internal control,strengthening the storage and use standards of enterprise seals,and improving the independence of internal audit.External supervision recommendations include strengthening the regulation of irregularities of the enterprise,strengthening the information disclosure regulation,increasing the intensity of punishment,improve the violation cost,in condition,we should improve the awareness of rights protection of small investors,further explore and perfect the group lawsuit system,give full play to the role of China securities and investor service center,to safeguard the interests of enterprises and small and medium shareholders better.