Research On The Impact Of Dual-Class Share Structure Of Bilibili And Iqiyi On Corporate Performance

On April 30,2018,the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s "Emerging and Innovative Industry Companies Listing System" officially came into effect.This document liberalized the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s prohibition on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from using dual equity structures to list companies since December 1989.Relevant regulations re-allow companies that meet certain conditions to use a two-tier shareholding structure to list in Hong Kong.A year later,the Shanghai Stock Exchange of China issued the "Science and Technology Innovation Board Stock Listing Rules." This document also broke the domestic A-share market’s prohibition on companies using a dual-shareholding structure for listing.The two documents in Hong Kong and Shanghai signify that China has officially introduced a dual-shareholding structure system.However,as of July 22,2020,among the 140 companies that have been listed on the Sci-tech Innovation Board,only two companies have chosen to use the dual-shareholding structure to go public,indicating that domestic companies still have doubts about the use of the dual-shareholding structure.Through reading the literature,this article knows that many scholars at home and abroad have conducted comparative studies on the corporate performance of dual-shareholding companies and single-shareholding companies,and the conclusions drawn are divided into two categories.One is based on the superiority of the dual-shareholding structure and recognizes the positive effect of dual-shareholding structure on corporate performance.The other is based on the increased degree of separation between cash flow rights and voting rights under the dual-shareholding structure.There is a negative impact on performance.Therefore,this article plans to compare the differences in shareholding structure design of two dual shareholding companies based on previous studies on the impact of dual shareholding structure on corporate performance,and then compare their shareholding concentration,shareholding checks and balances,abnormal connected transactions,and The difference in agency costs,first make a prediction of the operating performance of the two companies,and then compare the financial performance,non-financial performance and capital market performance of the two companies,and compare the results of the performance comparison with the comparison results of the previous four factors affecting corporate performance,To see if they can confirm each other.If they confirm each other,this article can draw the details that dual-shareholding companies should pay more attention to when designing the shareholding structure to better protect the interests of small and medium shareholders.By comparing the differences in the dual-shareholding structure design of the two companies,Bilibili and i Qiyi,this article first calculates and analyzes the differences between the two companies in terms of equity concentration,equity checks and balances,the proportion of abnormal connected transactions and agency costs.Secondly,this article draws preliminary judgments about the operating performance of the two companies based on previous research conclusions.Then,this article compares the actual operating results of the two companies,mainly involving three aspects: financial performance,non-financial performance and capital market performance.Finally,this article draws a summary of five case studies:(1)The degree of separation of the two rights of i Qiyi is greater than that of Bilibili;(2)The proportion of abnormal connected transactions of i Qiyi is greater than that of Bilibili;(3)Iqiyi’s two types of agency costs are higher than Bilibili;(4)Iqiyi The proportion of independent director seats of Yiqi is lower than that of Bilibili;(5)The operating performance of iqiyi is not as good as Bilibili.Based on this analysis,this article draws the following conclusions:(1)The founder’s holding of super voting shares is more conducive to improving corporate performance;(2)The exclusive use of super voting shares by controlling shareholders is not conducive to improving corporate performance.The following enlightenment is further derived:(1)Advocate the founders to hold super voting shares;(2)Avoid the "exclusive system" of super voting shares;(3)The benefits of dual-shareholding structure companies to small and medium shareholders Protection can be started from two perspectives: one is to voluntarily write clauses restricting super-voting shares in the company’s articles of association;the other is to actively establish a board of supervisors to enhance internal supervision mechanisms;(4)It is recommended that domestic regulatory authorities introduce a shareholder class action system as soon as possible to increase investment The protection mechanism of the interests of the owners.