Research On Ciphertext-Only Fault Analysis Of The Saturnin Family Of Lightweight Ciphers

Lightweight cryptographic algorithms are suitable for specific resource constrained environments to ensure the confidentiality,integrity,and authentication of data information.In order to evaluate the security of cryptographic algorithms,domestic and foreign scholars engaged in cryptography will use a series of analysis methods to detect the security of algorithms.Ciphertext-only fault analysis is a cryptanalysis technology that considers the security of the algorithm from the practical application of the cryptographic algorithm.It breaks the cryptographic algorithm by analyzing the information affected by the fault.This analysis method is based on the assumption of ciphertext-only attacks.It only needs to intercept the ciphertext information,which is easier to implement in the actual attack process.As its practical application significance and potential development prospects,this analysis method has received great attention from scholars engaged in cryptography and other fields both domestically and internationally.The Saturnin lightweight block cipher and the Saturnin-Short lightweight authenticated encryption algorithm were proposed in the IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology(To SC/FSE)in 2020.At present,there is no public researches of Saturnin lightweight block cipher and Saturnin-Short lightweight authenticated encryption algorithm against ciphertextonly fault analysis at home and abroad.This paper will study and evaluate the security of Saturnin and Saturnin-Short cipher under ciphertext-only fault analysis respectively.For Saturnin lightweight block cipher,this paper analyzes and discusses the security of the cipher under ciphertext-only fault analysis,proposes a new statistical differential fault analysis method,and constructs square-chi-maximum likelihood estimation and DICE-Hamming weight new dual distinguishers.The new statistical differential fault analysis method,compared to existing statistical fault analysis method,can perform import fault actions in deeper rounds of operations during the cipher transformation process,and recover key information with fewer attack faults to break the Saturnin cipher.The experimental results show that using the new statistical differential fault analysis method and the new dual distinguishers,can only use 656 faults to recovery the 256 bit original key of the Saturnin cipher with a success rate of no less than 99%.The new analysis method can achieve deeper import fault rounds,fewer faults,lower complexity,and higher accuracy to break the cipher,which performs better and greatly improves attack efficiency.The research results provide a new reference for the security analysis of other lightweight block ciphers.This paper proposes a statistical ineffective fault analysis method for the Saturnin-Short lightweight authentication encryption algorithm,and designs new dual distinguishers of probability symmetric chi-square-maximum likelihood estimation and harmonic meanHamming weight.In the ciphertext-only fault analysis of the Saturnin-Short cipher,this paper utilizes the correct ciphertext affected by ineffective faults and combines it with the statistical distribution of intermediate state values affected by ineffective faults to successfully break the cipher.The experimental results show that the new dual distinguishers proposed in this paper only requires 1097 ineffective faults to break the Saturnin-Short cipher with a 99% success rate.The new distinguishers reduce the required number of ineffective faults,total faults,time consumption,and complexity,which effectively improve the attack efficiency.The research results extend the application scenarios of ciphertext-only fault analysis and provide important references for the security analysis of other lightweight authentication encryption algorithms.