Decision Analysis Of Supplier Channel Encroachment From The Perspective Of Different Demand Information Endowment

With the rapid development of e-commerce,upstream suppliers in the supply chain can have the opportunity to sell their products directly to end consumers through establishing their own retail channels.However,due to the long-term lack of contact with consumers,the supplier may be disadvantaged in terms of demand information endowment when encroachment occurs.In order to deal with the difficulties and challenges brought by the heterogeneity of information endowment,effective coordination mechanisms need to be adopted among supply chain members to promote the cooperation and development of upstream and downstream,so as to alleviate the channel conflict and intensified competition in the retail market caused by channel encroachment of suppliers.From the perspective of different demand information endowments,this paper studies the impact of the supplier’s channel encroachment decision on the respective equilibrium earnings of the supply chain members when the supplier and the retailer trade through the revenue sharing contract.This paper aims to answer the three core questions:how the heterogeneity or homogeneity of demand information endowment among supply chain members affects the supplier’s channel encroachment decision;the impact of the supplier’s channel encroachment decision on supply chain members’ output,price decisions and equilibrium profits;and how to use revenue sharing contract so that the supplier and the retailer can benefit from channel encroachment and then realize channel coordination.So as to provide appropriate strategic suggestions for supply chain members to make relevant decisions and realize channel equilibrium.In view of the above research problems,this paper draws the following research conclusions.First,this research shows that when the sales efficiency of direct channel is high,the supplier prefers channel encroachment,but the revenue sharing rate needs to be limited to a small range to avoid the retailer being unwilling to continue ordering and selling products due to profit loss.Second,when there is heterogeneity in demand information endowment and supplier channel encroachment,with the increase of revenue sharing rate,the range of natural separation equilibrium decreases,while the range of distorted separation equilibrium expands.Third,this paper shows that when there is heterogeneity in demand information endowment and supplier encroachment,if the sales cost of direct channel is high and distorted separation equilibrium exists,a large revenue sharing rate can effectively alleviate the problem of double marginal effect caused by the downward distortion of the retailer’s order,and then a "win-win" situation can be reached between the supplier and the retailer.Fourth,Fourth,this paper finds that the supplier’s channel encroachment has a certain impact on the retailer’s preference for private information.