Research On Tunneling Behavior And Economic Consequences Of Major Shareholders Under Equity Pledge Of J Company

With the standardized development and improvement of the securities market,the financing channels are gradually diversified.Because of its low threshold,convenient operation and high financing efficiency,equity pledge is widely favored by major shareholders of listed companies,and have gradually become a common phenomenon in the capital market,and are becoming increasingly important in the capital market.Normally,the pledge of equity can quickly relieve the financing pressure arising from the development of the company and address the personal financial needs of the majority shareholder.However,when the pledge ratio and the frequency of pledges are too high,it will lead to the gradual significant separation of cash flow right and control right,intensify the agency conflict between shareholders,and transfer the cost and risk of encroaching on the interests of listed companies,resulting in the motivation of major shareholders to empty the company.At the same time,tunneling behavior is hidden,it is difficult to be detected by some investors in time on the basis of imperfect internal control system and inadequate external supervision system,it is likely to harm the interests of the company and minority shareholders,when the market is unstable,it will even affect the normal operation of the capital market,so it is very important to explore tunneling behavior under equity pledge.This thesis selects the listed Company J with a high proportion of pledge as the research object,by combing the basic situation of the company and the process and characteristics of equity pledge,based on principal-agent theory,asymmetric information theory,private benefits of control theory and tunnel effect Theory,this thesis deeply analyzes the motivation and means of tunneling listed companies by major shareholders under equity pledge,and discusses the economic consequences caused by the tunneling behavior of major shareholders of Company J under high-frequency pledge.Finally,in view of the consequences caused by the tunneling behavior,the thesis puts forward targeted preventive measures from the aspects of internal governance and external supervision.Through the case study of Company J,this thesis draws the following conclusions: High frequency or high proportion of equity pledge will increase the separation of major shareholders’ control right and cash flow right,and create conditions for major shareholders to implement tunneling behavior.The tunneling behavior of major shareholders using their own control power for private interests not only seriously infringes on the rights and interests of minority shareholders and other stakeholders,but also brings a series of economic risks to the enterprise,in the case of market instability,it will cause the irrational decline of the stock market,bring a strong impact to the market,and finally affect the healthy development of the capital market.