The Influence Of Managerial Myopia On Investor Relations Management

With the continuous standardization and institutionalization of the development of China’s stock market,investor relationship management has gradually become the focus of China’s listed companies.Investor relationship refers to the interactive relationship between an enterprise and its external investors,and investor relationship management is the management behavior of this interactive relationship.Investor relations management is an important channel for enterprises to communicate information with external investors from all walks of life.At present,academia has conducted a wealth of research on investor relations management from the perspectives of ownership structure,internal control,financing plan and company size.However,most of the existing literature studies investor relations management from the perspective of corporate financial characteristics,and few studies how managers’ behavior affects investor relations management from the perspective of management.According to agency theory,the goals of managers and business owners on both sides of information asymmetry are not the same。Consistent,business owners pursue the maximization of long-term enterprise value,while managers may pay more attention to their own interests.According to the theory of bounded rationality,managers under the separation of two rights may make irrational decisions that are not in line with the maximization of enterprise value out of their own choice or external pressure,among which short-sighted behavior is the representative behavior.According to the short-sighted theory,managers will make decisions that harm the maximization of long-term value of enterprises,so as to meet the improvement of enterprise benefits in the short term,so as to bring benefits to individuals.On the other hand,through literature analysis,this paper notes that investor relationship management reflects the characteristics of long-term investment.The construction of investor relationship management needs a lot of human and material resources,and its value to the enterprise can only be reflected in more than one accounting year.So how does managers’ short sightedness affect investor relations management? Short sighted managers may reduce investment in investor relations management to improve the short-term performance of enterprises.Based on the above theoretical analysis,this paper puts forward the core hypothesis of the article: Managers’ short sightedness will have a negative impact on investor relations management.This paper selects the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to2017 as the research object,and uses literature analysis and empirical analysis to test the impact of managerial myopia on investor relations management.The results show that managers’ short sightedness will have a negative impact on investor relations management;When enterprises face analyst tracking,the negative impact of managers’ shortsightedness is weakened,which proves that the existence of external supervision mechanism can alleviate the impact of managers’ shortsightedness on investor relations management;Compared with state-owned enterprises,the regulatory role of analyst tracking is stronger in non-state-owned enterprises.This paper makes innovations and contributions in the following aspects:(1)from the perspective of management behavior.Improve the research on the influencing factors of investor relationship management.(2)This paper defines investor relationship management as a long-term investment,and confirms this view through empirical evidence,which enriches the definition of investor relationship management.(3)It enriches the measurement method of managers’ shortsightedness and finds a more reasonable way to measure managers’ shortsightedness under the environment of China’s capital market.Based on the above research results,the following suggestions are put forward for the construction of enterprise investor relations management:(1)CSRC and other institutions should strengthen the guidance and supervision of investor relations management of listed companies,with the ultimate goal of protecting the interests of small and medium-sized investors.(2)Chinese listed enterprises should comprehensively improve the level of investor relations management,try to institutionalize and process investor relations management,and reduce the impact of irrational behavior of management on investor relations management.(3)Policy makers can require enterprises to disclose their investment in investor relations management as one of the standards to measure the level of corporate governance.