Research On The Influence Of Heterogeneous Institutional Investors ’ Shareholding On Total Factor Productivity

The report of the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China clearly pointed out that we should promote three major changes in the quality,efficiency and motivation of economic development,improve total factor productivity and achieve high-quality development.However,in recent years,some enterprises in China are facing the dilemma of imperfect governance mechanism and low governance level,which leads to insufficient innovation motivation of enterprises and continuous reduction of total factor productivity.At the same time,this situation is exacerbated by the global epidemic.In order to adapt to this huge pressure of macroeconomic development,fully implement the spirit of the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,and achieve the goal of high-quality development of China’s economy,the State Council of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China released “ opinions on building a more perfect institutional mechanism for the allocation of factor marketization ” in March 2020,proposing to “ stimulate social creativity and market vitality,and build a more perfect institutional mechanism for the allocation of factor marketization ”.However,in the process of improving the total factor productivity of enterprises,it will be restricted and affected by many internal and external factors.Therefore,how to improve the total factor productivity of enterprises and implement the national policy to achieve high-quality economic and social development has become a hot topic of concern to all sectors of society.While stabilizing the capital market,institutional investors can take advantage of their advantages in professional knowledge,capital reserve,information collection ability,investment experience and decision analysis to play an effective role in supervision and governance,alleviate the problem of corporate agency and financing constraints,promote enterprise R&D innovation,improve resource allocation mechanism,and improve enterprise total factor productivity.At the same time,as an important part of corporate internal governance,the impact of internal control on total factor productivity of enterprises has also attracted wide attention from all walks of life.As an important means of risk management and control,internal control plays a vital normative role in the quality of accounting information,business management,production and operation efficiency and economic benefits of a company.It can spontaneously adjust and correct the strategic objectives of the company,reduce the business risks of the company,and then improve the total factor productivity of the company to achieve high-quality development of the company.Based on this,this paper combs and summarizes the research literature of institutional investors ’ shareholding,internal control and enterprise total factor productivity,and puts forward the research hypothesis and constructs the empirical model combined with the theory of information asymmetry,principal-agent theory,signal transmission and stakeholder theory.Taking A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020 as the research sample,this paper empirically tests the following four aspects through empirical research :(1)Whether institutional investors ’ shareholding has an impact on enterprise total factor productivity and what kind of impact it has;(2)Whether different types of institutional investors have different effects on total factor productivity;(3)Whether the impact of institutional investors ’ shareholding on total factor productivity is different in different property rights;(4)The moderating effect of internal control on the relationship between ownership of heterogeneous institutional investors and total factor productivity.The empirical results show that :(1)the overall shareholding of institutional investors can significantly improve the total factor productivity of enterprises;(2)Pressure-resistant institutional investors ’ shareholding significantly improves the total factor productivity of enterprises;(3)Pressure-sensitive institutional investor ownership is negatively correlated with total factor productivity;(4)Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the positive impact of pressure-resistant institutional investors on total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises is stronger,and the negative impact of pressure-sensitive institutional investors on total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises is weaker;(5)Internal control plays a significant positive regulatory role in the relationship between heterogeneous institutional investors ’ shareholding and enterprise total factor productivity,but compared with pressure-sensitive institutional investors,internal control will play a greater positive regulatory role in the impact of pressure-resistant institutional investors on enterprise total factor productivity.Finally,according to the conclusions,this paper puts forward the following Suggestions :(1)Improve the supporting regulatory system of institutional investors.establishing the internal incentive and restraint mechanism of institutional investors,improving the information disclosure system of listed companies,and improving the mutual supervision and balance mechanism between institutional investors and management;(2)Strengthen the construction of internal control system,pay attention to the rationality of internal control system design,pay attention to the strict and effective operation of internal control,and supervise the internal control system;(3)Optimize the ownership structure of listed companies,promote the diversification of ownership structure,reduce the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholders,and promote the development of pressure-resistant institutional investors.Carefully treat the participation of pressure-sensitive institutional investors,actively guide the investment strategy of institutional investors to change from short-term speculation to long-term investment,and guide institutional investors to play a role in the new round of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.