Research On The Impact Of Controlling Shareholders’ Equity Pledge On The High-quality Development Of Listed Companies

High quality development is a distinctive feature of the new era.The realization of highquality development by listed companies is an important link,engine and driving force of highquality economic development.Since 2013,equity pledge financing has developed rapidly,and it is favored by shareholders of listed companies because of its fast and convenient operation.But at the same time,the equity pledge business will also have some negative effects.In recent years,it is common for listed companies such as "Oriental Garden","Huayi Brothers" and "Yiyang Xintong" to get bogged down by shareholders’ equity pledge,and the frequent "Thunderstorm" events of listed companies’ equity pledge due to the continuous downturn of the stock market in 2018 sounded the alarm of equity pledge.Therefore,facing the contradiction between the company’s high-quality development and financing needs,this paper aims to solve the following problems through research:(1)will the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge have a positive or negative impact on the high-quality development of listed companies?(2)What mechanism does the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge have an impact on the highquality development of listed companies?(3)How to reduce the risk of equity pledge business and fully mobilize its strength to become a combustion promoter to promote the high-quality development of listed companies?Controlling shareholders play an important role in listed companies and can influence the development of listed companies through their own behavior decisions after equity pledge.Based on the analysis of relevant cases,this paper analyzes the influence mechanism between the two,and finds the essential reason through the phenomenon.Taking some listed companies from 2013 to 2020 as research samples,this paper makes an empirical analysis on the research hypothesis through Excel and Stata software.Firstly,it analyzes the benchmark regression of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge affecting the high-quality development of listed companies,the grouping regression of property right heterogeneity and the regulatory effect regression of corporate governance characteristics.Secondly,it makes a robustness test from different aspects,Finally,it further studies the intermediary effect of tunneling mechanism and the relationship between the investment direction of pledged funds and the high-quality development of listed companies.Through empirical analysis,this paper draws the following conclusions:(1)the equity pledge of controlling shareholders will have a negative impact on the high-quality development of listed companies;(2)Compared with state-owned listed companies,the negative impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on the company is more obvious in non-state-owned listed companies;(3)The higher the degree of equity checks and balances and the higher the shareholding ratio of external institutional investors,the more it can restrain the negative impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on the high-quality development of listed companies;The combination of two duties will aggravate the negative impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on the high-quality development of listed companies;(4)After the pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity,it is more likely to have an adverse impact on listed companies through the tunneling mechanism;The tendency and proportion of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge show a significant positive relationship with the investment of funds in themselves or third parties,and at the same time,it will reduce the high-quality development level of listed companies.Through the negative phenomena caused by equity pledge,this paper deeply analyzes the essential reasons,finds the breakthrough of the problem,and puts forward targeted policy suggestions to standardize the equity pledge business.