| With the continuous development and innovation of science and technology,human capital is becoming more and more important for technological innovation enterprises,even more important than financial capital,and has become a type of resource that has a significant impact on the fate of enterprises.For technologically innovative companies,how to maintain founder control and ensure the effective use of their human capital has become an important issue.Equity financing is an important channel for enterprises to obtain funds,but equity financing will definitely reduce the voice of the founder and shareholders of the company,which is not conducive to the stability of the founder’s human capital.The dual-class share structure allows the founders holding a small amount of equity to own the majority of the voting rights of the company by setting up special voting rights,thereby continuing to control the company.Therefore,more and more technological innovation companies implement dual-class share structure.Although the dual shareholding structure can alleviate the contradiction between the maintenance of control rights and equity financing,it also facilitates the founders to use their power to infringe the interests of other small and medium shareholders.Therefore,it is necessary to study how to better use the dual-class share structure and give full play to its advantages,avoiding its risks is of great significance to the theoretical and practical circles.The dual-class share structure has a long history overseas.Due to the policy prohibition,many companies in our country chose to go public overseas in order to use the dual-class share structure in the past.In recent years,in order not to miss outstanding companies such as Alibaba and Tencent,in April 2018,Hong Kong took the lead in loosening restrictions on the dual-class share structure,allowing companies to go public with a dual-class share structure.On January 28,2019,the Science and Technology Innovation Board was set up,opening the way for China’s inland capital market to explore dual-class share structure.However,in recent years,there have been very few companies listed on the Science and Technology Innovation Board with a dual-class share structure.This thesis will choose Meituan,a listed company with dual-class share structure in Hong Kong,China,as the research object,and analyze the choose motivation and influence path of Meituan’s dual-class share structure,evaluate the effect of Meituan’s dual-class share structure from various dimensions,summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of implementing dual-class share structure in enterprises,and put forward suggestions for improving the dual-shareholding structure of the enterprise.It is hoped that it will bring certain reference value to enterprises in our country who intend to choose a dual shareholding structure.This thesis takes Meituan as the research object,and uses two research methods,literature research method and case analysis method,to sort out the research content related to this thesis.By reading the previous research results,this thesis summarizes the concept,historical process,implementation principles and characteristics of dual shareholding structure,and on the basis of shareholder heterogeneity theory,human capital theory,control theory and principal-agent theory,this thesis analyzes the motivation,influence path and implementation effect of Meituan’s dual-class share structure.This thesis argues that Meituan chose the dual-class share structure to ensure the control of the founding team while raising financing,to meet the needs of different types of shareholders,and to continue the long-term development of Meituan.The founding team of Meituan influences Meituan’s shareholders’ meeting,board of directors and management through the control in its hands,thus exerting various influences on Meituan.In terms of effect evaluation,on the basis of literature research and combined with the actual situation of the case company,this thesis selects appropriate evaluation indicators,and evaluates the specific effect of Meituan’s implementation of the dual-class share structure from three dimensions of strategy,governance and performance.Through the case analysis of Meituan’s implementation of dual-class share structure,this thesis draws the following research conclusions: first,dual-class share structure is actually a common choice of heterogeneous shareholders;The long-term strategic development of emerging enterprises with strong dependence on people;thirdly,there are still certain risks in the dual-class share structure,and a series of institutional guarantees are needed to give full play to its advantages.On this basis,this thesis puts forward the following suggestions: firstly,due to the excessive voice of the founder under the dual-class share structure,it is necessary to strengthen the internal and external supervision mechanism of the enterprise to prevent the founder from abusing the voting rights;secondly,due to the difference in information acquisition ability between founder shareholders and external shareholders under dual-class share structure,our country needs to supplement the information disclosure system to protect the interests of investors;finally,the exit system of the founder of dual-class share structure should be clearly defined.The enterprise can set a time-type sunset clause according to its own needs and give the option of terminating dual-class share structure to all shareholders.When the founder is no longer a qualified enterprise manager,the shareholding structure will be converted in time to protect the rights and interests of other shareholders.The innovation of this thesis is that it conducts an in-depth analysis of the influence path of the dual-class share structure,and evaluates the effect of the case company from the strategic dimension,the governance dimension and the performance dimension,and the analysis is relatively comprehensive.It is hoped that this thesis can enrich the case studies of my country’s dual-class share structure,and also hope that this thesis can provide reference for the design of the shareholding structure of domestic enterprises. |