Research On The Assets Value Preservation And Increment Of Mixed Ownership Reform From The Perspective Of Pay-Performance Sensitivity

In this paper,the financial data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share competitive state-owned listed companies from 2010 to 2020 are selected as samples for research.The effect of mixed ownership reform of competitive state-owned listed companies on asset preservation and appreciation effect,the governance effect of mixed ownership reform on executive compensation performance sensitivity and the effect of executive pay-performance sensitivity on assets preservation and appreciation are analyzed.On the basis of domestic and foreign studies,the mediation mechanism of executive compensation performance sensitivity,an internal governance factor,in the assets preservation and appreciation effect of mixed ownership reform is further studied.At the same time,marketization index is introduced to measure the level of external governance and its adjustment mechanism in the assets preservation and appreciation effect of mixed ownership reform is studied.First of all,the research background and significance of this paper are described.Due to the dual pressure of domestic and foreign competition,state-owned enterprises are gradually deepening the market-oriented reform.The transformation of the functions of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission makes maintaining and increasing assets value become an important management goal of state-owned assets,but the realization of the reform goal needs further optimization and innovation of governance mechanism.Currently,studies on the governance effect and economic effect of mixed ownership reform are often carried out independently,while studies on the correlation between governance effect and economic effect of mixed ownership reform are often based on theoretical analysis,lacking empirical studies to clarify the logical chain of realizing the effect of mixed ownership reform.Through reading and sorting out relevant literature,this paper sorted out the research about the effect of mixed ownership reform and the influence of internal and external governance factors on the effect of mixed ownership reform,then constructed the research framework of this paper,elaborated the main research content and selected research methods,and summarized the innovation points of this research.The paper defined the mixed ownership reform,the sensitivity of pay-performance and assets preservation and appreciation,and took principal-agent theory,modern property rights theory,optimal compensation contract theory and incentive compatibility theory as the theoretical basis for subsequent research.Based on the literature review and summary of theories and concepts,this study deduced theoretical hypotheses;determined the research samples and the required variables.Using testing methods such as multiple regression models and regulating intermediary effect,this study set up models to test research hypothesis and used research tools such as Excel,Stata to verify and analyze the related theoretical assumptions.Through theoretical analysis and empirical test,the results of this study show that:overall,mixed ownership improves the performance of state-owned listed companies in the value dimension.At the governance level,mixed ownership improves the performance sensitivity of executive compensation of state-owned listed companies,and the performance of value dimension of state-owned listed companies is positively affected by the performance sensitivity of executive compensation.Among the effects of mixed ownership on the preservation and increment of assets,the sensitivity of executive compensation performance plays a partial intermediary role,which is one of the mechanisms for the reform to realize the preservation and increment of state-owned assets.In regions with low level of external governance,mixed ownership has stronger positive effects on assets preservation and appreciation.Executive compensation performance sensitivity can compensate external governance mechanism to some extent.Further analysis shows that in the state-owned listed companies managed by the local government,the effect of executive pay-performance sensitivity on assets preservation and appreciation is significantly weaker than that in the state-owned listed companies managed by the central government.Finally,based on the above research conclusions,some policy suggestions are put forward,such as creating conditions for non-state-owned major shareholders to participate in governance,improving the correlation between executive compensation and the company’s business performance goals,and focusing on mixed ownership reform in regions with low level of external governance and state-owned listed companies controlled by the central government.