Research On The Impact Of Equity Incentive Methods On The Performance Of State-owned Enterprises

Our country has always attached great importance to the reform of state-owned enterprises,especially after my country’s economy has shifted from high-speed growth to high-quality development,in order to boost economic development with the development of state-owned enterprises,the state has embarked on an in-depth solution to various problems of state-owned enterprises.The core of various reforms is to promote the market-oriented operation of state-owned enterprises,introduce market-oriented mechanisms into the capital structure and internal management of enterprises,and build state-owned enterprises into independent,diversified and flexible enterprises with modern property rights and governance systems,so as to support its economic development needs.Among many reform methods,the implementation of equity incentive system in state-owned enterprises is a representative.There are many ways of equity incentives.At present,state-owned enterprises mainly adopt three modes: stock options,stock appreciation rights and restricted stocks;many state-owned enterprises even use a combination of restricted stocks and stock options.There are differences in the mechanism and effect of various equity incentive methods.At this time,discussing the differences in the impact of different equity incentive methods on the performance of state-owned enterprises,It has important reference significance for state-owned enterprises to choose more clearly the mode of equity incentive and reform of equity incentive system.Under this background,this paper studies the influence of stock option,stock appreciation right and restricted stock which are the three main equity incentive modes in state-owned enterprises on the performance of state-owned enterprises.In addition to the introduction,the paper is divided into five chapters.The first chapter introduces the concepts of equity incentive and performance of state-owned enterprises and expounds the theoretical basis of principal-agent theory,optimal contract theory and incentive theory.The second chapter in the process of development of equity incentive and combing the actual development of the integration in China.on the basis of a detailed overview of the main mode of the implementation of equity incentive in China at present stage,industry distribution,our country state-owned enterprise equity incentive schemes and characteristics of capital source on this basis,through the research analysis and correlation analysis to explore the implementation of equity incentive and the relationship between the enterprise development.The third chapter uses principal component analysis to construct the performance variables of state-owned enterprises and selects enterprise size,Tobin’s Q value,shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and executive compensation as control variables and establishes the DID model between the implementation of equity incentive and enterprise performance.Chapter iv based on the model of design in the previous chapter,in the sample when the choice,choose the stock options,restricted stock,stock appreciation rights group three equity incentive object of state-owned enterprises as the experimental group,the corresponding control group is not the implementation of equity incentive enterprises,and USES tend to score matching method to match the samples,overcome the endogenous problem of sample and variable.After the empirical results are obtained,the influence of different incentive modes on the performance of state-owned enterprises is analyzed.The fifth chapter summarizes the conclusions and puts forward policy suggestions.Enterprises should choose their own equity incentive mode,optimize the design of contract elements to make up the deficiency of the current equity incentive mode,and encourage the mixed application of multiple equity incentive modes.Through the analysis,this paper draws the following conclusions: First,no matter what kind of equity incentive method is adopted,it has a positive impact on the performance of state-owned enterprises;The negative effects,if any,are minimal.Secondly,among the three kinds of equity incentive methods,restricted shares have the greatest effect on improving the performance of state-owned enterprises,while stock appreciation rights have the least effect on improving the performance of state-owned enterprises,and the effect of stock options on improving the performance of state-owned enterprises is between the them.The innovation points of this paper are as follows :(1)most of the existing articles on the application effect of equity incentive in state-owned enterprises choose one equity incentive mode for research,but this paper makes a horizontal comparison of various equity incentive modes.(2)As one of the equity incentive methods adopted by state-owned enterprises,stock appreciation right has not been studied by many scholars,but this paper takes this method as one of the key points.(3)When setting the performance variables of state-owned enterprises,this paper does not choose the unilateral indicators of financial performance or non-financial performance as usual,and takes into account the particularity of state-owned enterprises and the performance of equity reform.It can be more accurate and comprehensive evaluation of state-owned enterprises.