Research On The Signaling Effect Of Government Subsidies On Enterprise Innovation Performance

Represented by the "Meng Wanzhou Incident",the anti-globalization trend has intensified in recent years.Facing the fierce international competition in science and technology,Chinese high-tech enterprises continue to face severe challenges on the way to achieve sustainable development.At this background,the State Council issued the document "Several Opinions on Promoting the High-Quality Development of National High-tech Industrial Development Zones" to increase support for them and break the current situation where they are stuck in a deadlock in 2020.Due to the negative externalities and high risks of corporate innovation activities,on the one hand,the government’s encouragement,guidance and support are an indispensable part of the corporate innovation process,making up for the loopholes formed by market defects,and rationally allocating limited resources to those who need it.On the other hand,investors in the external market can also receive the official certification signal of the enterprise and provide financing support for them,so that the enterprise’s innovation input can be converted into innovation output and productivity in a high-speed operation mode,then promote economic growth.The research purpose is whether the investment of government subsidies can promote the innovation ability of high-tech enterprises,and whether the government subsidies have played a signal effect to obtain more venture capital for enterprises.It is hoped that this research can further improve the support policies,ease the pressure of enterprise research and development,then improve business performance.Based on this,first,we define concepts and theories such as signal transmission by combing domestic and foreign literature and analyzing the deficiencies of existing research.Secondly,in order to explore the effect of differentiated government subsidy policies,we use the method of "keyword" screening to distinguish innovation subsidies and non-innovation subsidies,then put forward the research hypothesis that two types of subsidies affect the innovation performance of enterprises.Thirdly,we analyze the current status of government subsidies,innovation performance and venture capital obtained about the research samples.Fourth,we use the unbalanced panel data of 215 high-tech enterprises listed on the GEM from 2013 to 2019 to study the impact of two types of subsidies on the innovation performance of enterprises and verify the signaling effect of the two types of subsidies.In view of the differences in the ownership structure and operating capacity of different high-tech enterprises,we further analyze the effect of ownership nature and enterprise size on the effectiveness of government subsidies.Through empirical research,we found that:(1)Innovation subsidies have an inverted "U"-shaped effect on the innovation performance of high-tech enterprises,and transmits a significant signal.(2)Compared with state-owned enterprises,the inverted "U"-shaped relationship between innovation subsidies and innovation performance of non-state-owned enterprises is stronger,and the signaling effect is also stronger.(3)Compared with large-scale enterprises,the inverted "U"-shaped relationship between innovation subsidies and corporate innovation performance of small-scale enterprises is stronger,and the signaling effect is also stronger.(4)Compared with innovation subsidies,the impact of non-innovation subsidies is not significant,and it does not send positive signals to the outside world,and the above results do not change under the conditions of different enterprise ownership and enterprise scale.According to the conclusions,we put forward suggestions,for enterprises,it is necessary to scientifically make plans about using government subsidies,give full play to the initiative to seek financing support,transform new ideas for innovation and development,and give full play to the added value of innovation subsidies.It is responsible for enterprises to establish and improve the information disclosure system of enterprise subsidies.For the government,it is important to improve differentiated subsidy policy and continuously optimize the innovation incentive policy by rationally screening the subsidy object to realize the aim of precise supporting and consolidating the sustainable operation ability of the enterprise.At the same time,it is necessary to respect the status of market players,stimulate the vitality of the signal effect of innovation subsidies and build a three-in-one communication and interaction platform for the government,enterprises and external markets.