Research On The Infiuence Of Controlling Shareholder Pledge On The Investment Efficiency

To enhance the efficiency of capital allocation can realize rational allocation of resources and make full use of the enterprise investment as an important financial activity.The influence of enterprise investment on the efficiency of capital allocation should not be ignored.Our economy can achieve stable person,leave the investment efficiency and quality.Therefore,how to improve the investment efficiency of listed companies,should be the goal of mutual concern.The equity of listed companies in China is relatively concentrated,and most companies there is a controlling shareholder,because in the listed companies of the two rights separation structure,principal-agent problems inevitably exist,the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge will inevitably impact on the investment decision of listed companies to bring,and then affect the investment efficiency of the enterprise.The controlling shareholders who are not optimistic about the long-term development of the company will be more inclined to seek personal gains,resulting in excessive investment.For the controlling shareholders who believe that the company has long-term development potential,they will become more conservative,resulting in insufficient investment.This paper follows the "Controlling Shareholder-Behavior Transmission Mechanism-the Efficiency of Investment" research route,empirically the effect of controlling shareholders equity pledge on the investment efficiency,and the supervision of the external audit and internal control as the important mechanism,the controlling shareholder will play a constraint and checks and balances.So this article will external audit quality and the quality of internal control is also discussed in the same framework,in order to improve the investment efficiency of listed companies to make a little incremental contribution.Based on principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,PBC theory and financing constraint theory,this paper discusses the influence of equity pledge by controlling shareholders on investment efficiency,and tests the moderating role of external audit quality and internal control quality in the relationship between the a-share listings in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2020.The following conclusions are drawn :(1)Equity pledge by controlling shareholders will reduce the investment efficiency of enterprises.(2)The higher the quality of external audit is,the more it can alleviate the negative impact of equity pledge by controlling shareholders on investment efficiency.(3)The higher the quality of internal control is,the more it can alleviate the negative impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on investment efficiency.(4)Through the analysis of specific investment projects,it is concluded that equity pledge will increase the investment in fixed assets,financial assets and technology assets of listed companies,and reduce the inventory investment.Finally,according to the above research conclusions,corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward from five aspects:perfect the information disclosure system of shareholding pledge;increase regulation and standard for equity pledge;set up scientific investment decision-making procedures;improve the corporate governance structure and internal control;give full play to the supervision of the certified public accountants audit,and points out in this paper,the research limitations and prospects.