Research On The Governance Of Excessive Earnings Management Of Listed Companies

Earnings management has been widely concerned by academic circles since it was introduced into China.China’s Ministry of finance has promulgated and implemented 39 accounting standards to standardize the earnings management behavior of listed enterprises.At the same time,with the continuous development of social economy,China has further improved the securities law,and increased the punishment for excessive earnings management in the amendment to the criminal law.However,even so,cases of excessive earnings management continue to occur.So why does excessive earnings management persist despite repeated prohibitions? Under the background of the continuous development of China’s capital market,how to strengthen the governance of excessive earnings management? This has become the foothold of this thesis.This thesis takes listed companies as the research object,and the basic contents of the research include:(1)using the literature research method to summarize the relevant theories of earnings management,so as to lay the theoretical foundation of this thesis;(2)Using the method of case analysis,this thesis makes an in-depth study on the excessive earnings management behavior of Kangmei pharmaceutical,yabaite and Ruixing coffee,analyzes and reveals the main motives and means of excessive regulation,and summarizes the common behavioral motives and means of excessive earnings management of listed companies;(3)Explain the current situation of the earnings management governance system of Listed Companies in China,analyze and reveal the main problems existing in the existing governance system,and reveal and analyze the specific root causes of the governance difficulties of excessive earnings management of domestic listed companies;(4)On the basis of the above analysis,this thesis puts forward the comprehensive improvement countermeasures of earnings management governance from the perspectives of enterprises,market and government,in order to standardize the earnings management behavior of listed companies.At present,China has established a relatively standardized earnings management system,but there are still some problems in this system.The thesis finds that there is a lack of effective supervision at the level of corporate governance;There are serious deficiencies in audit capacity at the firm level;At the system level of accounting standards,the definition of excessive earnings management is not clear;The punishment of excessive earnings management at the national level is not effective;These are the specific problems that lead to the repeated prohibition of excessive earnings management.The root causes are closely related to the unreasonable ownership structure of enterprises,the lack of independence of firms and the imperfect supervision system of the CSRC and the government.Accordingly,this thesis puts forward comprehensive countermeasures to standardize the earnings management behavior of listed companies from the four levels of enterprises,firms,CSRC and government,including: optimizing the company’s management system and improving the enterprise’s internal supervision system to realize the standardization of the enterprise’s own financial behavior;By improving the professional ability of audit institutions and improving the audit mechanism of accounting firms,we can enhance the supervision ability of accounting firms;Improve the supervision of the CSRC by improving the early warning and delisting mechanism of listed companies and ensuring the effective implementation of the new securities law;Strengthen the supervision of the government by improving accounting laws and regulations and improving the supervision ability of the government and so on.The research of this thesis can provide theoretical exploration for promoting the standardization of earnings management of Listed Companies in China;At the same time,the research conclusions and Countermeasures obtained in this thesis have practical application value for improving and perfecting the internal and external supervision ability of China’s listed companies and scientifically standardizing the earnings management behavior of listed companies.