| With the sustained development of China’s economy,the financing needs of enterprises have expanded correspondingly,and the number of entrants in the bond market has also increased.Among them,the bonds of state-owned enterprises are favored by a large number of market investors because of the existence of "implicit guarantee" by the government and few default events.However,in 2015,"11 Tianwei MTN2" failed to pay the bond interest in time and became the first state-owned enterprise bond to default.Since then,the "rigid payment" of state-owned enterprises has also been broken.As an important part of China’s financial products,bonds play an important role in helping enterprises to raise funds.Intensive default events reduce the enthusiasm of market investment and seriously affect the development of bond market and economic growth.Therefore,in view of the fact that the number of state-owned enterprises’ default has increased greatly in recent years,this paper selects several representative enterprises as cases to study the related issues.The main research questions in this paper are: What are the causes of large-scale default of state-owned enterprise bonds from the perspective of supervision? And put forward corresponding suggestions for the supervision deficiencies exposed in the causes.This paper mainly uses literature analysis,statistical analysis and case analysis,aiming at the increasing number of defaults of state-owned enterprise bonds in recent years and the intensive defaults in 2020,selects Northeast Special Steal Group,Yongmei Group and Huachen Group as the objects for case study.Firstly,the theoretical basis and literature review of this paper are introduced by literature analysis.Secondly,statistical analysis is used to analyze and summarize the default situation of China’s bond market at present,and the common characteristics of bond default of state-owned enterprises are separately summarized,and the default situation of selected cases in this paper is combed and stated.Then,the case analysis method is used to analyze the causes of bond default of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of supervision: firstly,there are deficiencies in the supervision of bond-issuing enterprises,the obvious phenomenon of insufficient solvency and low profit level in enterprise operation is ignored,and the lack of supervision and punishment for the non-compliance of enterprise information disclosure leads to the outbreak of business crisis;The objective due diligence of professional intermediaries in the bond market is insufficient.Underwriters and rating agencies are faced with state-owned enterprise bonds,and they have the psychology of relying on the government to do their job objectively,which makes the default risk of low-quality state-owned enterprise bonds underestimated.At the same time,the government’s administrative power is allowed to intervene excessively,and the market investment behavior is not guided and managed.In view of the lack of supervision,some suggestions are given accordingly: strengthening the examination and monitoring of enterprises before and after issuing bonds and improving the information disclosure system;Strengthen the underwriter’s responsibility and underwriting quality review,strengthen the review of rating standards of rating agencies,and optimize the rating mechanism;Clarify the boundary between supervision and government administrative intervention,and strengthen the guiding management of market investment behavior;Strengthen the effect of market supervision and law enforcement,and constantly innovate supervision methods.The research significance of this paper is to focus on the default of state-owned enterprise bonds from the perspective of supervision,so as to put forward the defects and deficiencies of state-owned enterprise bonds supervision more deeply,and give targeted supervision suggestions,hoping to provide suggestions when similar problems are found,and give some practical reference for the healthy development of China’s bond market in the future. |
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