Tripartite Evolutionary Game Research On The Supervision Of Opportunistic Behavior In Project Construction Period

In recent years,China’s construction industry has developed vigorously.However,during the construction period of the project,due to the characteristics of long construction period,large investment scale,large number of participants,high mobility and strong uncertainty,as well as information asymmetry and inconsistent interests and goals among the participants,opportunistic behaviors are easy to occur,which not only affects the project performance,but also affects the healthy development and social stability of the construction industry.Therefore,during the construction period of the project,how to prevent opportunistic behaviors of project participants is very important to improve the quality and safety of the project.Based on evolutionary game theory,this thesis makes a concrete analysis of opportunistic behaviors among the construction party,the supervisor and the owner in the construction process of large-scale engineering projects,and constructs a tripartite game model of the owner,the construction party and the supervisor.Specifically,firstly,considering the influence of the owner’s reward and punishment on the behavior choice of the constructor and the supervisor,a tripartite evolutionary game model of opportunistic behavior supervision in the construction period of the project based on reward and punishment mechanism is constructed,and the influence of the owner’s reward and punishment to the constructor and the supervisor and the government’s punishment on the behavior strategy choice of the game subject is analyzed.Secondly,in view of the close relationship between the quality and safety level of construction projects and the public interest,the paper takes into account the level of public opinion supervision and the level of reputation profit and loss,integrates the reputation mechanism and reward and punishment mechanism in the previous model,and analyzes the influence of the level of public opinion supervision and reputation profit and loss on the behavior choice of the constructor,supervisor and owner.Finally,the two models are simulated by MATLAB software to verify the rationality and effectiveness of the established models,and specific analysis is made according to the simulation results,so as to provide relevant suggestions and countermeasures for improving project quality management.Through the construction and solution of the model,and the simulation with MATLAB software,the following important conclusions can be drawn: First,when only considering the influence of reward and punishment mechanism on the behaviors of the three parties,the reward and punishment mechanism set by the owner should meet the condition that the sum of the reward and punishment amount of the owner to the construction party and the supervisor should be at least greater than the income of their respective opportunistic behaviors;Secondly,the owner’s reward and punishment measures can have a positive impact on the behavior strategy choice of the construction party and the supervisor,but excessive reward is not conducive to the owner’s performance of supervision duties;Thirdly,the punishment of the owner plays a decisive role in the behavior choice of the construction party and the supervision party,while the reward plays a limited role;Fourthly,the supervision of construction projects by government departments is conducive to improving the stability of project quality;Fifthly,when considering the interaction of reputation mechanism and reward and punishment mechanism,it is helpful to urge the owners in the game system to choose the behavior strategy of strict supervision,and the three-party game players can all tend to adopt positive behavior strategy more quickly;Sixthly,there is a critical value in the level of public opinion supervision.When the level of public opinion supervision is greater than the critical value,the reputation mechanism can play a positive guiding role.To sum up,this thesis constructs the three-party evolutionary game model of opportunistic behavior supervision in construction project under reward and punishment mechanism and the three-party evolutionary game model of opportunistic behavior supervision in construction project under reward and punishment-reputation mechanism.By solving the model and simulating,this paper analyzes the process of mutual game among the constructor,the owner and the supervisor in the process of project construction,and provides theoretical reference for avoiding opportunistic behavior in construction projects and improving the quality and safety level of projects.