| Enterprises are the innovation main body and micro foundation to realize the self-reliance and self-improvement of science and technology in China.The innovation at the enterprise level is restricted by the agency problem,and the corporate governance mechanism has become the key factor affecting the enterprise innovation.Starting from the external control mechanism,institutional investors,as a professional institution in the capital market,are of great importance in improving enterprise innovation financing constraints and improving the governance environment;Starting from the internal relationship between the two powers,the management,as the operator who fully understands the development and operation of the enterprise,has the information advantage of grasping the trend of innovation.A series of studies show that institutional investors can effectively promote enterprise innovation,and there is a significant substitution effect between management shortsightedness and enterprise innovation.Does institutional investors promote enterprise innovation by inhibiting management shortsightedness?In order to explore this problem,based on the theories of capital heterogeneity,principal-agent,shareholder activism and management shortsightedness,this paper expounds the mechanism of institutional investors’ innovative value creation function and the factors inducing management shortsightedness under the framework of"capital heterogeneity",and analyzes that management shortsightedness is caused by performance compensation sensitivity and management catering pressure,This paper puts forward a series of research hypotheses that institutional investors can promote enterprise innovation by reducing the sensitivity of performance compensation and alleviating the pressure of management to cater to and restrain the shortsightedness of management.In order to test the hypothesis,this paper takes the data of China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share main board listed companies from 2012 to 2019 as the research sample,selects securities investment funds as the representative of institutional investors,and verifies the impact of investment funds on enterprise innovation by setting a fixed effect model of heterogeneous institutional investors,On this basis,using the interactive term model of performance compensation sensitivity and the intermediary effect model of management catering to pressure,this paper verifies the influence mechanism of investment funds to promote enterprise innovation by inhibiting management shortsightedness.Finally,Tobit and PSM models are used to test the endogeneity of model selection and sample selection respectively.The empirical results show that:(1)investment funds can significantly promote enterprise innovation.(2)Investment funds cannot have a positive impact on enterprise innovation by reducing the sensitivity of performance compensation,the internal incentive of management’s short-sightedness.(3)Investment funds promote enterprise innovation by alleviating the external incentive of management shortsightedness-management catering to pressure.(4)The regression results of Tobit model and PSM model are consistent with the previous paper,which proves that this study has a certain stability.In view of the above results,this paper puts forward the following policy suggestions:the government should strengthen the construction of capital market,encourage institutional investors to participate in corporate governance and establish a medium and long-term performance view;Enterprises should carefully identify the types of institutional investors,and establish and improve a diversified management incentive mechanism;Institutional investors clarify their main responsibilities,give full play to their professional expertise,and actively supervise,assist and support the development of enterprise innovation activities.The research of this paper provides a new idea for the research on institutional investors and enterprise innovation. |
PDF Full Text Request