| Under the background of rural revitalization,creating and enhancing regional public brands for agricultural products is one of the important means to achieve quality-oriented and brand-driven agriculture,as well as a favorable leverage for China’s implementation of its brand-building strategy.The construction of regional public brand for agricultural products can not only promotes regional agricultural economy and increases local farmers’ income,but also consolidates poverty alleviation achievements in rural areas,prevents large-scale return to poverty,and further contributes to achieving common prosperity.However,there is still a big gap between the value and influence of China’s current agricultural regional brands and world-famous brands such as New Zealand Zespri and American Sunkist.How to create and enhance the regional public brand for agricultural products is an important issue in the current development of agricultural economy and society and promotion of rural industrial prosperity,which is also the focus and starting point of this article.To this end,this article constructs a master-slave game model for the cooperative creation of regional public brands considering costs and subsidies.The model analyzes the strategic choices of manufacturing enterprises and brand operating companies under the influence of input costs and subsidy allocation at different stages,and compares the game results under different models.Then,using evolutionary game theory,this article constructs a three-party game for promoting regional public brands for agricultural products to explore the strategic choices of manufacturing enterprises,brand operating companies,and local governments in brand promotion.Simulation analysis is conducted on evolutionary stable strategies.The following conclusions are drawn from the research:(1)In the process of creating and promoting regional brand for agricultural products,the strategic choice of brand builder will be affected by government subsidy,input cost,brand benefit,brand influence and so on.(2)In brand creation,when the impact of brand investment is high or the government subsidy is high,the manufacturing enterprise and brand operating company are willing to initiate the regional brand rather than not initiating it.In addition,when the brand investment is more influential and the initial investment cost is small,the manufacturing enterprise and brand operating company are willing to cooperate.What’s more,the initiator does not affect the degree of brand investment.Finally,whoever initiate the regional brand,the brand operating company can always get a brand premium.In other words,the retail price of a regional brand is always higher than the retail price that the brand is not established.When the brand influence is high,the wholesale price is higher than without a brand.Otherwise,the wholesale price is lower.(3)In brand promotion,appropriate subsidies are conducive to the participation of the three parties,that is,agricultural product manufacturers improve product quality,brand operating companies actively operate,and local governments strictly supervise;brand operating companies’ rewards to enterprises should be within a reasonable range,at the same time,higher-level governments increase rewards to local governments,which is also conducive to the participation of the three parties;reducing participation costs and increasing participation benefits are conducive to motivating agricultural product manufacturers and brand operating companies to participate enhance regional brands of agricultural products.Finally,policy recommendations are proposed from the perspectives of producers,operators,and government.These provide a basis for manufacturing enterprises to create brands and enhance their quality while offering theoretical support for active creation and operation of brands by brand operation companies as well as providing theoretical suggestions for governments in formulating appropriate subsidy policies. |
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