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Research On Product Bundling Strategy Under Different Industry Cooperation And Intratype Competition

Posted on:2024-09-27Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X P ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569306929490844Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Bundling may have different profit effects for different product sales.In recent years,joint memberships launched through cross-industry partnerships have flourished.In the form of bundled platform memberships,joint memberships rapidly increase the number of buyers(consumers)on two-sided platforms,and then promote the increase of sellers(suppliers)through cross-group externalities,which in turn promote the increase of buyers,so it becomes one of the main means for two-sided platforms to expand the scale of users.Similarly,in order to improve market share,more and more enterprises begin to provide add-ons to support the development of their basic products under peer competition.Enterprises in competition often adopt different pricing methods for their add-ons based on product quality:bundle pricing or add on pricing.However,as the bundling strategy expands the market demand,it may also squeeze the marginal profit of products.In the case of increasingly complex business environment,how to choose reasonable and effective bundling strategy is an urgent problem for platforms and enterprises to solve.Based on the above practical practice,this paper takes two-sided platform memberships under cross-industry cooperation and enterprise add-ons under peer competition as the research object,and discusses their optimal bundling strategy respectively.Specifically,for the bundling of two-sided platform memberships,by considering the cross-group externalities,this paper studies the optimal pricing of users on both sides of the platform and the optimal profit of the platform under different strategies,so as to provide the conditions for platform strategy selection.The research results show that,the cross-group externalities intensity of the two two-sided platforms is too high,too low or seriously unbalanced,which may hinder the platform to carry out joint memberships.For the bundling of add-ons,by establishing Hotelling model and considering the asymmetric quality of basic products and the asymmetric quality of add-ons,this paper studies the optimal pricing strategy for add-ons of competitive firms with horizontal and vertical differences.It is found that when the intrinsic value consumers get from add-on is small and the quality difference of basic products between two firms is moderate,the high-quality firm should adopt add on pricing and the low-quality firm should adopt bundle pricing.Otherwise,both firms should adopt bundle pricing or both should adopt add on pricing.In addition,when multiple equilibria occur,it is Pareto optimal equilibrium for both firms to adopt bundle pricing strategy,and it is risk optimal equilibrium for both firms to adopt add on pricing strategy.The innovation points of this paper are as follows:First,using platform memberships as the carrier,the two two-sided platforms are combined with bundling through cross-group externalities;Second,the quality difference between the base products and the quality difference between the add-ons are considered.This study enriches the research results in the field of bundling and provides new management insights for platforms and enterprises in the selection of sales strategies.
Keywords/Search Tags:Bundling strategy, Cross-group externalities, Two-sided platform, Add on pricing, Operation management
PDF Full Text Request
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