| Since China formally established the equity pledge system in the Guarantee Law in 1995,the equity pledge business has developed very slowly in China’s capital market due to the imperfect system and unclear division of rights and responsibilities between the two parties.Until the opening of equity pledge repurchase business in May 2013,domestic equity pledge business was also in full swing.As a kind of pledge loan,equity pledge has increased the channels for enterprises to obtain funds and reduced financing constraints to a certain extent.However,the hidden "tunneling" risk and control transfer risk of equity pledge of major shareholders are a disturbing factor affecting the stable development of the capital market.As early as 2018,the relevant departments had issued relevant regulations to reduce and resolve the risks arising from equity pledge.Since then,the pledge risk in the market has declined to a certain extent,but it has not been effectively alleviated.Therefore,in October 2020,the State Council again proposed in the Opinions on Further Improving the Quality of Listed Companies to take a positive and prudent approach to resolve the risks arising from equity pledge and strengthen and consolidate the risk control mechanism.In this context,it is of great practical significance to explore the impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on the performance of corporate social responsibility for understanding the underlying risk factors behind equity pledge.This paper takes the A-share listed companies in China from 2013 to 2020 as the empirical test sample.First,it conducts qualitative and quantitative analysis on the status quo of equity pledge from the perspective of institutional evolution,pledge scale,pledge proportion,industry and sector.Second,combined with the existing literature research conclusions,as well as the principal-agent theory,legitimacy theory,and the theory of private interests of control rights,this paper analyzes the impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on the performance of corporate social responsibility,and introduces the shareholding ratio of the first major shareholder and two key variables that affect the behavior of controlling shareholders,to explore the impact of ownership structure on the relationship between them,and then puts forward three main assumptions of this paper.Third,build a model and conduct empirical research to further support the assumptions proposed above.Fourth,further analyze and identify the motives existing in the process of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge,and deepen the further understanding of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge.Finally,this paper summarizes the research conclusions and gives relevant policy implications.This paper makes a useful supplement to the research on the economic consequences of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge,and also provides new evidence to further confirm the existence of the "interest tool view" of social responsibility.This study shows that:(1)there is a significant inverted "U" relationship between the proportion of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and the performance of corporate social responsibility.Under the low proportion of equity pledge,controlling shareholders’ equity pledge can promote enterprises to actively perform social responsibility,However,with the further increase of pledge ratio,equity pledge will inhibit the performance of corporate social responsibility.(2)The concentration of corporate equity and the existence of other major shareholders can have a significant impact on the relationship between the share pledge ratio of controlling shareholders and the performance of corporate social responsibility.Compared with companies with highly concentrated equity and multiple other major shareholders,the inverse "U" relationship between companies with more dispersed equity distribution and companies with only one major shareholder is more significant.All the above conclusions passed a series of robustness tests. |
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