An Empirical Study On The Impact Of Independent Directors With Legal Background On The Quality Of Information Disclosure Of Listed Companies

In recent years,the problem of information disclosure in China’s listed enterprises is particularly serious.Various violations not only affect the judgment of investors,but also affect the reputation of enterprises to a certain extent,and have a negative impact on the development of society and the capital market.Therefore,only by continuously improving the corporate governance structure can we avoid such violations as much as possible.The independent director system was born in this environment.Since the introduction of the independent director system,independent directors have been playing an important role in corporate governance,and the research on legal independent directors has been a hot topic in the recent research of the independent director system.There are different views on whether senior executives or independent directors of academic legal background play a role in supervising the behavior of listed companies.This paper carries out empirical research on the influence of independent directors with legal background on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies,and further studies whether independent directors with legal background can play a supervisory and advisory role in corporate governance.While studying the relationship between the legal independent directors and the information disclosure system,this paper further studies the action mechanism between the two,and adopts the internal control level as the adjustment variable of this paper to further verify whether the internal control level can become the transformation mechanism between the independent directors of the legal background and the information disclosure of listed companies.Based on the independent director system,principal-agent theory,information disclosure system and other related theories,this paper uses the relevant theories of empirical analysis to carry out mathematical research.This paper selects the relevant data of listed A-share companies from 2012 to 2020 to study the empirical relationship between legal independent directors and the quality of information disclosure of listed companies from the perspective of internal control level.After research,it is found that there is a significant positive correlation between legal independent directors and the quality of information disclosure of listed companies,indicating that the existence of legal independent directors can significantly improve the quality of information disclosure of companies,indicating that legal independent directors can actively perform their supervisory functions in enterprises,and inhibit enterprises from concealing information.In addition,this paper further conducts the heterogeneity test and the adjustment effect test.From the results of the heterogeneity test,the positive correlation between legal independent directors and the quality of information disclosure of listed companies is only significantly positive in non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises with low equity concentration,and there may be some heterogeneity in different enterprise sizes,This shows that the relationship between legal independent directors and the quality of information disclosure of listed companies has a certain degree of heterogeneity in different natures,different ownership structures,and different enterprise sizes.Then in the results of the adjustment effect test,it can be concluded that the level of internal control has a significant adjustment effect between the legal background independent directors and the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.The level of enterprise internal control can affect the impact of legal independent directors on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.The higher the level of internal control,the greater the impact of legal independent directors on the quality of information disclosure.This paper deals with the endogenous problem through the tool variable method,uses the average value of legal independent directors of other companies in the same industry as the tool variable,and conducts an endogenous test.Finally,based on the results of empirical analysis,this paper puts forward some policy recommendations based on the actual situation,mainly focusing on the enterprise’s internal,regulatory departments and the legal independent director system,It is expected to further promote the sound development of China’s capital market.