Research On The Impact Of Short-and Medium-term Performance Of Performance Compensation Commitment On Stock Price Crash Risk

In the context of increasingly active M&A market with irrational anomalies,the policy of performance compensation commitment was implemented.However,with its gradual expansion,the imperfection of performance compensation commitment system itself has gradually emerged,which has brought great negative impact on M&A,external investors,and Chinese capital market.High goodwill,goodwill impairment and stock price crash risk are representative manifestations.Therefore,it is of practical significance to explore the impact of performance compensation commitment on goodwill,goodwill impairment and stock price crash risk.Although existing studies focus more on the impact of M&A on goodwill and goodwill impairment and the negative impact of performance compensation commitment,there is still a lack of research on the mechanism,especially whether goodwill and goodwill impairment can be used as signals to judge the difference of performance compensation commitment in M&A events.Therefore,it is theoretically valuable to analyze the fermentation and transmission of goodwill and goodwill impairment between performance compensation commitment and stock price crash risk.Existing research on the effect of performance compensation commitment is characterized by short-term stages.This paper combines its short-term and medium-term effects to explore the differential effect of different stages.Taking M&A events in A-share market from 2008 to 2020 in China as samples,this paper focuses on the relationship among performance compensation commitment,goodwill,and stock price crash risk.According to the development stage of performance compensation commitment,this paper divides performance compensation commitment into sections from the perspective of short and medium term.The implementation of performance compensation commitment is divided into two parts:the growth rate of performance commitment and whether performance commitment is completed.Goodwill and goodwill impairment are selected as intermediary variables according to the promotion degree of M&A events.Negative skewness return coefficient is used to measure stock price crash risk.Through empirical test,this paper draws the following conclusions:(1)In the relationship of performance compensation commitment and stock price crash risk,the selection of performance compensation commitment reduces stock prices crash risk;the high growth rate of performance commitment increases stock price crash risk;the stock price crash risk of the merged companies which do not finish performance compensation commitment increases;(2)In the relationship of performance compensation commitment and goodwill,the selection of performance compensation commitment promotes the formulation of goodwill,and the high growth rate of performance commitment decreases goodwill impairment during the performance commitment period;(3)In terms of the mediating role of goodwill and goodwill impairment,goodwill mediates the relationship between the selection of performance compensation commitment and stock price crash risk,and goodwill impairment mediates the relationship between the growth rate of performance compensation commitment and stock price crash.In the further test,this paper divides the samples into parts according to the quality of internal control and the shareholding ratio of institutional investors respectively,and studies the difference of the relationship between performance compensation commitment and stock price crash risk under different levels of internal and external governance.In addition,this paper performs robust tests through the methods of propensity score matching and shortened time interval.After the conclusions,this paper raises corresponding practical suggestions from different perspectives.